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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis is based on six months fieldwork from January to June 2014 in Seoul, the capital 
of South Korea. I got the opportunity to go back to South Korea in August 2015 where I met 
with some of my informants again. Although I did my fieldwork in South Korea, my 
informants were refugees from North Korea. As the last divided country in the world it was 
the basis of a very intriguing fieldwork. I spent my days with North Korean refugees living an 
urban life among the local population in Seoul. 
It was during my exchange year in Bangkok, Thailand in 2012 that my interest for 
North Korea arose. I bought the award winning book “Nothing to Envy” by journalist Barbara 
Demick (2009) at a secondhand bookshop at the tropical island of Koh Phi Phi. In the book, 
Demick explains how North Koreans are told they have nothing to envy and that North Korea 
is the best country in the world. This statement can be juxtaposed with satellite images of an 
almost blackened North Korea surrounded by vast amounts of lights that illuminates 
neighboring countries of China, South Korea and Japan. That book was my motivation to 
learn more about refugees in general. What I had learned through media was little about the 
North Korean people and their situation. I wanted to try to understand their experience of 
being a refugee, and a citizen of South Korea. I shall discuss Demick’s book further in the 
paragraph “Previous research on the topic” below. 
 
 
(Duell, 2014)  
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RESEARCH QUESTION  
 
In this master thesis I want to explore the challenges North Korean defectors face being 
integrated into South Korean society. How do North Korean defectors overcome the obstacles 
of resettling in a new country, and at the same time deal with identity, establish networks and 
overcome possible stigmas? This thesis focuses on the everyday life of North Korean refugees 
living in urban areas in South Korea. I wanted to research identity and the social self, trying to 
capture this by looking at consumption and possible stigmas in the society. A central question 
is whether the new modern society, where the individual has fewer permanent attachments 
and more choices than ever before, leads to a greater understanding and depth of knowledge 
for the individual, or whether it leads to confusion and rootlessness. 
 
In January 1997 the South Korean government enacted special laws, “Law for the Protection 
of and assistance to North Korean defectors”, concerning the increasing number of defectors 
from North Korea (Sohn, 2013, 112). South Korea has a very strict policy towards accepting 
refugees in general. In 2015, only 94 refugees out of 2900 applicants seeking asylum status 
were granted (Park Katrin 2015). But towards North Korean refugees South Korea is very 
accepting. According to article 3 of the South Korean constitution, all Koreans, including 
those who reside in the North, are South Korean citizens. In this sense defectors are not 
regarded as migrants, but as refugees from a nationalist or humanitarian point of view (Sohn, 
2013, 112). South Korea does not recognize North Korea as a state, but simply considers it 
self-proclaimed and illegitimate. Although defectors are considered by law citizens of South 
Korea there is an on-going effort to turn them into South Korean “cultural citizens”, which 
has to be “obtained through the cultural practices that define cultural belonging” (Chung, 
2008, 4).  
Defectors will probably never be able to fully erase their “North Koreanness”, but I 
was interested in which steps they take to try to become modern citizens of Seoul, or if indeed 
this was something they wanted. Difficulties dealing with identity and belonging arise as they 
now are South Korean citizens on paper, but North Koreans by birth. According to sociologist 
Hae Yeon Choo, “North Korean settlers are expected to get rid of their ethnic markers and 
transform themselves into modern citizen-subjects of South Korea” (2006, 576). I want to see 
how modernity becomes a powerful ethnic marker separating North Koreans from South 
Koreans. Modernity can be thought of as the historical development from traditional societies, 
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to industrialization and capitalism, arriving at the current modern states characterized by 
globalization (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991). People’s living conditions, life paths and 
experiences change as a consequence of this development. Identity formation is no longer so 
easily available because: 
 
Globalization, the decline of the welfare state, increasing social mobility, greater flexibility in 
employment, insecurity in personal relationships—all these developments are contributing to a 
sense of fragmentation and uncertainty (Buckingham, 2008, 1). 
 
The International Crisis Group (ICG)1 writes: “South Korea is prosperous and generous, with 
a committed government and civil society, and yet refugees from the North almost all fail to 
integrate or thrive” (2011, i).  
 
DEFECTOR OR REFUGEE?  
 
There are now over 26,000 North Korean defectors residing in South Korea. In 2013, 1,516 
North Korean refugees came to South Korea, bringing the cumulative total to 26,124 by the 
end of December 2013 (Ministry of Unification, n.d. a). For varying reasons these people 
chose to flee North Korea, known as The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to 
The Republic of Korea (ROK), South Korea. Although this seems like a small number 
compared to the 24.5 million inhabitants residing in North Korea (Ministry of Unification n.d. 
b), fleeing North Korea is a testament to how the North Korean society and the Kim regime’s 
policies work. This limited sample size of North Koreans living in South Korea today is an 
indication of the future to come. Defectors come from a country: 
 
                                                          
1 
  
 “The International Crisis Group is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental 
organization committed to preventing and resolving deadly conflict. The International Crisis 
Group is now generally recognized as the world’s leading independent, non-partisan, source 
of analysis and advice to governments, and intergovernmental bodies like the United Nations, 
European Union and World Bank, on the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict” (ICG 
n.d.). 
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where an all-powerful bureaucracy makes almost all decisions about their lives; there is 
almost no choice in education, employment or even food. New arrivals describe a bewildering 
rush of modernity, consumption and choice that rapidly overwhelms them (ICG 2011, i). 
 
These border crossers are called “defectors”. The word defector is a politically loaded term 
that may not be descriptive of the group of people escaping North Korea. A “‘defector’ is a 
person who does not return to his or her country for political reasons” (Hassig and Oh, 2009, 
218). The word defector means someone who is politically disloyal to their country of origin. 
The very act of leaving North Korea without state permission is a political crime by law 
(Hassig and Oh, 2009, 218; Human Rights Watch n.d.). Only a handful of the most loyal 
citizens, usually the elite, are allowed to legally travel to another country. Fleeing their 
homeland is an extreme and dangerous step, but maybe not as dangerous as voicing complaint 
about the regime. Those who choose to speak against the state are perceived to show 
insufficient respect towards the state, leadership and the Korean Workers’ Party (Human 
Rights Watch n.d.). The citizens of North Korea are prisoners trapped inside the country and 
North Korea: “defies an international agreement it has pledged to uphold. The 1966 
agreement says, ‘Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.’ ” (Harden, 
2012, 172-173). 
The difference between a “defector” and a “refugee” is that a defector is a person who 
abandons his or her country or cause in favor for an opposing one, while a refugee is 
according to the 1951 United Nations Convention: 
 
someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group, or political opinion (UNHCR 2010). 
 
The definition of “defector” is not well suited for North Koreans who choose to escape North 
Korea for reasons other than political ones. Most North Koreans do not leave the country 
because they are politically dissatisfied, but for economic reasons. As I have learned through 
my informants, most of them look back nostalgically to North Korea, and many would love to 
move back as soon as the economic and human rights situation is improved. Some of them are 
keeping alive memories of better days, clinging to the hope of returning to their homeland, 
family and friends. My informants however could not see that unification would be realized in 
the nearest future. There is even a small number of North Korean defectors who are “re-
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defecting” back to North Korea. This is a very interesting phenomenon, but unfortunately I do 
not have the room or information to discuss it further2. Even if refugees have the capacity to 
“return,” they will find the place changed, themselves changed and, possibly, even those left 
behind changed. 
The majority of those who escaped during the 1990s and 2000s were driven by hunger 
and destitution, looking for resources and food. They fled in order to improve their lives and 
some for bare survival. In migration studies there is the use of “push” and “pull” to 
understand why people migrate. There is something that “pushes” people from their homes, 
and something that “pulls” them to their new home. One of the factors may be economic 
migration, not having enough money, land, or food to eat. Others leave because they are not 
satisfied with their human rights, not being free to practice religion or freedom of speech. 
Some leave because of political migration, such as war and have to flee their homes for fear 
of being killed or imprisoned. Even though there are good reasons to leave, there are always 
good reasons to stay as well. The “pull” factors can include freedom to practice human rights, 
availability of work and a better quality of life.  
Defectors were until 1997 called “gwisun” in South Korea, meaning “someone who 
had surrendered after seeing the light”. Later, it changed to “talbukja”, “those who have fled 
the North”, and then to “saetomin”, “people of a new land”/ “new settler” which is the official 
name used by the South Korean government. (Hassig and Oh, 2009, 219). I will be using the 
terms defector and refugee interchangeably throughout this paper in absence of better terms. I 
choose to use the term defector because it is the most frequently used term to describe North 
Korean border-crossers in an international context. 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 
  
 This is a very interesting phenomenon since these people have invested and 
sacrificed a lot leaving North Korea in the first place, so why are they defecting back? There 
is nobody except those who re-defect that know the reasons behind it, but there are many that 
speculate. Some think that it is because of either threats of harming, imprisoning or killing 
their families they left behind in North Korea. Others think it is because despite the South 
Korean government efforts, defectors cannot adapt to this new society and realize how far 
behind they are so they lose their motivation to stay (Herman, 2013; Spezza 2012; Hosaniak 
2011). 
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STATISTICS ON NORTH KOREAN DEFECTORS IN SOUTH KOREA  
 
North Korean Refugees in South Korea 
Year/ 
Classifi
cation 
~’98 ~’01 ’02 ’03 ’04 ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08 ’09 ’10 ’11 ’12 ’13 합계 
Total 
Male 831 565 510 474 626 424 515 573 608 662 591 795 404 369 8,049 
Female 116 478 632 811 1,272 960 1,513 1,981 2,195 2,252 1,811 1,911 1,098 1,145 18,668 
Total 
947 1,043 1,142 1,285 1,898 1,384 2,028 2,554 2,803 2,914 2,402 2,706 1,502 1,514 
 
26,717 
 
(Ministry of Unification, n.d. a) 
 
Before the Korean War (1950-53), people from both nation states defected to the opposing 
one. Generally more people defected from the North. In earlier decades, defectors were 
celebrated as national heroes (“yongsa”) in South Korea, as it was military personnel or the 
Pyongyang elite 3 who defected. They also had valuable information, higher education and 
better social skills, and thus they could adapt more easily to the South Korean society. These 
national heroes were presented in press conferences and used as internal propaganda during 
which they praised South Korea and criticized North Korea (Hassig and Oh, 2009, 220). With 
only a few “heroes” arriving in South Korea each year, they were no financial burden on the 
government. The South Korean government actively encouraged defection and showered 
successful defectors with monetary and non-monetary gifts. 
By the early 2000s’ there were under a thousand defectors in total, but by the end of 
2013 the total number was over 26,000, and is quickly approaching 30,000. After the floods 
and famine in the middle of the 1990s, the end of the Soviet Union’s subsidies, and Kim Jong-
Il’s death in 1994, North Koreans began fleeing the country looking for food and resources. 
                                                          
3 
  
 “The elite population is defined as the several thousand top party, government and 
party officials living in Pyongyang” (Oh and Hassig, 2000, 37). 
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The demographics of the defectors have changed drastically. The number of defectors is 
growing, and people from all walks of life are defecting. Whereas in the past almost all were 
single adult males, women began to outnumber men in 2002, and this is still the case in 2014, 
with about 70% being female defectors (Ministry of Unification, n.d. a). The large number of 
women among defectors is mostly due to the societal structure in North Korea. In North 
Korea the man is the head of the family and is most likely to have state-assigned jobs to 
which they have to report (Hassig and Oh, 2009, 222). Women can move more freely, so it is 
easier for them to escape. In previous decades it was people with resources who defected 
North Korea, but now it is under- or unemployed workers, the unskilled, the uneducated, the 
farmers, housewives and “kochebi”4, not the Pyongyang elite that is defecting.  
Annually there is an average of between 1,500-2,000 defectors arriving in South 
Korea. As the majority of defectors come from the three northernmost districts in North Korea 
it coincides with easier accessibility to border areas, politically the least “reliable” parts, 
poverty and their natural environment (Harden, 2012, 152). This will be explained in more 
detail in chapter three. As the number of incoming defectors is growing, and their political 
usefulness is diminishing, the attitudes towards defectors are changing. Defectors bring with 
them virtually no capital or material goods, and many have to start their lives from scratch. 
Now defectors are sometimes looked down upon as South Korean government freeloaders. 
There are a few success stories, “but the heroes of almost all the "success stories" of 
North Korean defectors hail from the former elite, suggesting a close correlation between a 
person's position before defection and subsequent chances of success in the South” (Lankov, 
2006, 12). I will be explaining in chapter three, how songbun5 affects a person’s adaptability 
in South Korea. North Korean defectors are granted certain benefits that other migrants do 
                                                          
4 
  
 Kochebi are usually orphaned children, either by parents who had passed away or 
were themselves out looking for food. They roam the streets looking for food and shelter. The 
term arose during the Great Famine, when kochebi started to appear on the streets en masse. 
There are still kochebi in North Korea. Sadly kochebis are most likely to never leave the 
country, and those who manage to do so tell tales of repatriation (Demick, 2010). 
 
5 
  
 Songbun is the stratified socio-political class system according to which all North 
Koreans are ranked (Collins 2012). 
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not, to help them adapt to the South Korean society more easily (Choo 2006). Although it is a 
very generous government support system, “over the last decade this structure has undergone 
remarkable changes, the most important of which is a steady decline in generosity” (Lankov, 
2006, 9).  
The South Korean Ministry of Unification (MoU) has gone from a policy explicitly 
aimed at encouraging defection, to a policy of quietly discouraging it (Lankov, 2006). During 
the years of the “Sunshine Policy” during Kim Dae-Jung government (1998-2003) the official 
South Korean political attitude towards defectors changed. Seoul moved towards a policy of 
discouraging defection to keep a peaceful engagement with the North. The “Sunshine Policy” 
was a series of efforts to reconcile with North Korea. This culminated in reunions of the 
separated families of the Korean War and a summit talk with North Korean leader Kim Jong-
Il. For these efforts, Kim Dae-Jung was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000. 
 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON THE TOPIC  
 
Not much is known about North Korea, and North Korean authorities have succeeded for 
many years to keep their border tightly shut for both people and information. We are now 
learning more about North Korea, mostly information coming from journalists, defectors, 
former diplomats and travelers. The study of North Korea is no longer unexplored territory, 
and over the past years there has been a significant increase of books published about North 
Korea (Armstrong 2011).  
Most of the literature has been on the Kim regime and leadership, and has more of a 
political science feel to it. But still the volume of other works has produced a platform for 
analyses and observations, beyond what the mass media portrays (Armstrong 2011). Little has 
been written about the people of North Korea or about defectors, until recently. Even though 
restrictions prohibit foreigners to access North Korea, the large community of defectors living 
outside of North Korea offers an invaluable insight and knowledge for understanding life in 
North Korea.  
Fieldwork and other first-hand research is mostly impossible for outsiders to do. There 
is not much academic work done, meaning work done by intellectuals and professional 
academics grounded in evidence-based work and research (Armstrong 2011). One of the more 
academically oriented books is by Ralph Hassig and Kongdan Oh (2000; 2009). They have 
written extensively on North Korea and also about the history of Korea. Works in 
anthropology are scarce, but there are a few anthropologists in the field of North Korea and 
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defectors. The first anthropologist I found was Dr. Chung Byung-ho. He has a few 
publications about the topic on defectors living in South Korea. His work mostly deals with 
identity problems and he also has an article written about North Korean refugee children in 
China.  
Other anthropologists are Sonia Ryang and Sandra Fahy. Ryang’s research 
encompasses diverse topics including diaspora, identity, the cultural logic of nation-states, 
ideology, and Marxism, among others. Ryang is ethnic Korean, but grew up in Japan. Her 
research is mostly about North Koreans living in Japan (Ryang 2012). Fahy looks more 
generally at the refugee flow in the region. Her own fieldwork is concerning refugees in both 
Seoul and Tokyo (Fahy 2011). Topics she is engaged in are famine, government 
irresponsibility, refugees and internally displaced persons. 
Several international aid organizations have written about North Korea. Joanna 
Hosaniak is the senior program officer with the Seoul-based NGO, Citizens’ Alliance for 
North Korean Human Rights (NKHR). NKHR is one of the oldest NGOs in South Korea 
devoted to North Korea issues. Hosaniak has published about defectors in South Korea based 
on her work at NKHR. Another North Korean expert is historian Andrei Lankov. He was born 
in Russia and during his education at Leningrad University he attended Kim Il-sung 
University in Pyongyang in 1985. He is the author of the book “The Real North Korea: Life 
and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia” (2013).  
A Commission of Inquiry (COI) established by the United Nations Human Rights 
Council (UNHRC) published a report in February 2014. This report, chaired by former 
Australian judge Michael Kirby, is about the human rights violations North Korea commits. 
The UN Commission was refused entry to North Korea to conduct the inquiry, but that did not 
stop them from obtaining testimonies from defectors living outside the DPRK. The report 
concluded that the North Korean government has committed systematic human right abuses at 
a scale “without parallel in the contemporary world”, including extermination, murder, 
enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions, and other sexual violence (Human 
Rights Watch n.d.). The Human Rights Watch as well as The International Crisis Group post 
annual reports on the conditions inside North Korea. The South Korean Ministry of 
Unification posts frequently about the situation of defectors in South Korea with statistics, 
and about the general situation in the inter-Korean relationship.  
In the last decade defector biographies has reached the bookshelves. These books have 
given people an insight into their lives lived in North Korea as well as how they are coping 
living outside of the DPRK. One of the best English books based on refugee testimony is 
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journalist Barbara Demick’s “Nothing to Envy” (2009), mentioned in my introduction. 
Demick interviewed North Korean defectors who escaped to South Korea. She interviewed 
six people from the same area in North Korea, Chongjin in North Hamgyong province. She is 
not making generalizations about the whole of North Korea, but carefully depicts lives lived 
in a particular area, giving the reader a feeling for the society. Although it is written by a 
journalist, it has an anthropological touch to it as she is interested in the lives of ordinary 
people in a society. Other defector influential biographies are “Aquariums of Pyongyang: 10 
years in the North Korean Gulag” by Kang Chol-hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, “Escape from 
Camp 14: One Man's Remarkable Odyssey from North Korea to Freedom in the West” (2012) 
by Blaine Harden and Shin Dong-hyuk and “A Thousand Miles to Freedom: My Escape from 
North Korea” (2015) by Eunsun Kim and Sebastien Faletti. “Escape from Camp 14” became a 
movie in 2012 called “Camp 14: Total Control Zone”. Mr. Shin was a main witness to the 
United Nations “Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea”. However, there 
are controversies as Shin Dong-hyuk has admitted on two separate occasions to have changed 
key parts of his story6 (Fifield 2015).   
 
MY INFORMANTS AS REPRESENTATIVES FOR THIS GROUP OF PEOPLE 
 
I followed a handful of defectors in their everyday lives to get an insight into their challenges 
as citizens of South Korea. My wish is to tell about their common interests and ideas, while at 
the same time show their individuality, uniqueness, individual choice and patterns of action. 
All my informants lived in urban areas of Seoul, South Korea. Before coming to South Korea, 
they stayed in China or other countries for periods ranging from less than one month to 
several years. At the time of the study, the participants had lived in South Korea from four to 
eight years. 
Most of my informants live in the outer districts of Seoul, mostly near Incheon. Some 
of them live centered around the Hana centers which are an extension of Hanawon7. My 
                                                          
6 
  
 Several defectors are now speaking up, because of the controversy with Shin Dong-
hyuk (Hyeon-seo Lee, 2015). Although he did not speak the whole truth, there is no denying 
that he has been subject to torture. 
 
7 
  
 Hanawon is the resettlement center all North Korean defectors have to stay for three 
months for re-education. Hanawon will be described in more detail in chapter three. 
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closest informant lived 30 minutes away by subway. Some of them stayed in the apartments 
provided by the South Korean government, while others had moved to apartment complexes 
on their own. At the end of my fieldwork I had seven informants. Although I did not have 
many informants I had both sexes, young and middle aged, but all over the age of 18 years 
old. I had more female informants than male, which coincides with the statistics. I only had 
one married informant, and she was married to a South Korean. All other informants were 
single. They lived either alone, with a sibling, a single parent or both parents. 
 
Short facts about informants: 
“Sulli”, woman early forties, from North Hamgyong in North Korea, arrived in South Korea 
in 2006.  
“Nana”, woman early thirties, from North Hamgyong in North Korea, arrived in South Korea 
in 2008.  
“Krystal”, woman late thirties, from Pyongyang in North Korea, arrived in South Korea in 
2007. 
“Dana”, woman mid-twenties, from North Hamgyong in North Korea, arrived in South Korea 
in 2010.  
“Victoria, woman mid-twenties, from South Hamgyong in North Korea, arrived in South 
Korea in 2010.  
“Harry”, man mid-twenties, from North Hamgyong in North Korea, arrived in South Korea in 
2009.  
“Park”, man mid-twenties, from Pyongyang in North Korea, arrived in South Korea in 2007.  
 
 
CHAPTERS TO COME  
 
This thesis consists of six chapters including the introduction and conclusion chapter. 
In chapter two I will present my method chosen for this fieldwork. Along with 
methodological perspectives and challenges, there will be a description of the fieldwork 
location Seoul and the history of South Korea.  
Chapter three will consist of ethnography. There will be a description of local arenas 
for defectors, as well as a historical, political and societal context from North Korea. The 
songbun system will be introduced, and I hope to show how songbun affects defectors in their 
adaptation process after arrival in South Korea. To understand defectors better I will also 
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explain the escape routes preferred out of North Korea, and then out of China. An account of 
Hanawon and the support system the South Korean provide for defectors will be at the end of 
the chapter.  
Theoretical aspects will be introduced in chapter four along with a discussion of South 
Korean “Koreanness”, Korean nationalism, identity and stigma. I will discuss the aspects and 
life worlds perceived as important and meaningful to them. It is about people who have left 
their familiar life worlds for then to recreate and build new ones. How do they present the 
North Korean history, their own choices and actions, themselves and their history? How to 
interpret the events and situations that arise in the face of the South Korean society? 
Chapter five will be a short discussion about modernity and consumption among 
defectors in trying to shed their “North Koreanness”. As North Koreans could barely be 
recognized as consumers in their homeland, arriving in the capitalist South has its challenges. 
Chapter six summarizes and concludes the main points raised in this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
History, method and introduction to the field 
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This chapter begins with an introduction to the historical background of Korea, explaining 
how Korea became divided during the Korean War and the history of South Korea as an 
independent nation-state. After the historical introduction I move towards discussing my 
fieldwork in Seoul, and how doing fieldwork in an urban city had its challenges. 
 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
 
 
(World Atlas n.d.) 
 
The Korean Peninsula was one until 1948. Before the division it was a predominantly 
homogenous ethnic population, proud of its unique language and rich culture. The Korean 
people were under 500 years of feudal kingdom and from 1910-1945 under colonial rule by 
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the Imperial Japanese (Collins, 2012, 8-9). Japanese imperial rule was brutal, and the Korean 
people suffered, and still there are ill-feelings between the two countries.  
The division of Korea was a result of war. When World War II came to an end, and the 
Allies defeated the Japanese, the Korean peninsula was assigned to the Allies. Following a 
United Nations arrangement, The Soviet Union was to administer the north while the United 
States to be in charge of the south. The Soviet Union and the United States were unable to 
agree upon joining Korea as one, and in 1948 this led to the establishment of two separate 
governments. Neither government recognizes the other and both consider themselves as the 
legitimate government of all of Korea. 
In the South, Syngman Rhee was elected and the Republic of Korea was established 
on August 15th 1948, taking over the control from the US military. However, in the north, the 
Soviet Union refused to hold free elections. A communist state, The Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea was formed with Kim Il-sung as the leader on September 9th 1948 
(Collins, 2012, 8-9). The conflict escalated into open warfare when North Korean forces, 
supported by the Soviet Union, invaded South Korea on the 25
th
 of June 1950 (The War 
Memorial of Korea n.d.). Taken by surprise, without military strength, Seoul was taken by 
North Korean forces after only three days, and South Korean forces was forced back to the 
city of Busan after just two months (The War Memorial of Korea n.d.). In September 1950 the 
United Nations counter attacked by flying in at Incheon, and cut of the North Korean forces. 
With the power of the UN and US forces, North Korean military was forced all the way back 
to the border with China at the Yalu River. A South Korean victory was imminent. At this 
point, in October 1950, Chinese forces crosses the Yalu River and entered the war. The 
fighting ended on 27
th
 of July 1953, when an armistice was signed at the 38
th
 parallel (The 
War Memorial of Korea n.d.). An armistice agreement is not a peace treaty, so technically 
North and South Korea are still at war.  
After the war both sides built barriers to stop each other from crossing the border. 
Now a four kilometer wide Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which is the most militarized border 
in the entire world, divides the country. After the Korean War, the North and South developed 
into two separate governments. South Korea is a democratic republic with a free market 
capitalist economy, while North Korea has a centralized command planning economy and 
describes itself as a socialist republic. The division of the nation and the aftermath of the 
Korean War left both states in ruins, and both states began building the country from bottom. 
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SOUTH KOREA  
 
South Korea is located at the peninsula of East Asia bordering North Korea in the north, 
Yellow Sea to the west and Sea of Japan to the east. The population of South Korea is about 
50 million (World Population Review, 2014). It is important to understand the development of 
the South Korean society to understand the confusion North Korean defectors are 
experiencing when they arrive in South Korea. 
After the Korean War education became one of the pillars of South Korea in which 
they invested a lot. This dedication to education became the driving force for South Korea's 
economic turnaround. South Korea went through an extensive economic, social and political 
transformation in a few decades. In the 1960s South Korea developed from being one of the 
poorest countries in Asia, comparable with some of the poorest countries in Africa, to 
becoming one of the world’s wealthiest nations (Forbes, 2014). South Korea has become the 
only nation among the various countries that gained independence after WWII to evolve from 
an aid recipient country to an aid donor.  
Along with educating the population, grassroot efforts such as the “New Community 
Movement” based on the Korean traditional communalism helped the country forward (Han, 
2004, 70). Community members were helping the villages participate in industrialization and 
the development process through joint efforts. Ordinary people were building the country 
from the ground up. In Korea, like in many Confucian societies, people have a strong sense of 
collectivism, ascribing great value to sacrificing individual desires for the “greater good” of 
the group. Confucian principles include age and gender based hierarchy as well as individual 
submission to the family.  
South Korea's political history is marked by alternating periods of autocratic and 
democratic rule. Currently Park Geun-hye is in office as the first female president in South 
Korean history. South Korea is also proud of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban 
Ki-moon and President of the World Bank, Dr. Kim Jim-yong. South Korea has gone through 
an amazingly rapid and successful technological transformation. Development in high-tech, 
computer industry, education, culture and overall economy has been substantial. Through 
expanding international trade and an export based economy, South Korea has demonstrated to 
the world its rich cultural heritage as well as modern technology.  
Education is seen as crucial in South Korea, and the competition to get into the most 
prestigious universities is extremely stiff. It is common with private lessons at academies after 
school, and work pressures are enormous, particularly for secondary school students. In South 
20 
Korea, every student is obligated to take the College Scholastic Ability Test (CSAT) in order 
to apply for university. The CSAT result determines the life trajectory of the individual, as 
well as his or her family. There is hard competition for entering a top university. The most 
prestigious universities are called S.K.Y, an acronym for Seoul National University, Korea 
University and Yonsei University. Admission to one of the three is believed to secure one’s 
career and social status.  
When South Korea joined the ranks of developed countries some decades ago, the 
suicide rate increased. South Koreans are under enormous pressure to succeed at work, school 
and in relationships, and to care for their families, fueling an abysmal suicide rate that is the 
highest in the OECD group of developed countries (OECD 2012). In the South Korean 
society psychological illness is seen as a taboo, and anyone suffering from it is considered 
weak, brewing a strong societal resistance against treatment (Hosaniak 2011). Both young, 
middle-aged and old see suicide as an escape from the stresses of modern life (OECD 2012). 
Big global corporations such as Samsung, Hyundai, LG and Kia have made South 
Korean products and technology international household names. The technological progress 
made fertile ground for the cultural revolution South Korea is experiencing now. The South 
Korean wave called “Hallyu”, the South Korean music industry, TV dramas and movies as 
well as the cosmetic industry, are taking the world by storm. In 2012 almost everyone was 
listening to Psy’s “Gangnam Style”. Even the most reclusive state, North Korea, seems to be 
caught in the wave, its citizens watching South Korean dramas and buying South Korean 
products (Lee Young-jong 2014). 
In Seoul, and South Korea more generally, one may easily get the impression that 
people are obsessed with appearance and “beauty”. Commercial posters adorn the subway, 
streets and media, where keeping up with the latest fashion and cosmetic duds is viewed as 
important. Somewhat different from Western ideals of beauty, South Korea almost has a 
single template for what is considered beautiful. Because of this cosmetic surgery is prevalent. 
In Gangnam, one of the most affluent areas of Seoul, several streets are dedicated to plastic 
surgery clinics.  
Although South Korea is one of the most technologically advanced countries in the 
world, alongside there are many traditional aspects. Korean traditional society places 
significant weight on paternal family ties, purity of blood, and ethnicity. Confucian ideology 
is still strong, where personal ties, credentials and social networks are essential in everyday 
life.  
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THE ANTHROPOLOGIST IN LIMINALITY  
 
To become a “real” anthropologist is has been thought of as necessary and essential to go 
through the “ritual” of doing fieldwork, and participant observation:  
 
In the Boasian tradition, becoming a cultural anthropologist requires successfully "passing" a 
ritual sequence of research experiences as a precondition of professional status and role 
(Johnson 1984 quoted in Robben and Sluka, 2007, 77).  
 
The anthropologist’s role during the fieldwork is to put himself or herself into how the local 
experience and interpret their lives. According to Bronislaw Malinowski, often referred to as 
the father of anthropological fieldwork, we have “to grasp the native's’ point of view, his 
relation to life, to realize his vision of his world” (Malinowski, 1961, 25). The goal is to 
understand the natives on their own terms, but with thorough reflection on conditions and 
restrictions surrounding the actual opportunity for a researcher to see "the natives' point of 
view ". This is done through participating in, and by becoming a part of human social life. 
The anthropological project is to describe, explain and interpret what you find.  
At the same time, the anthropologist also needs to keep a distance; to take a step back 
and analyze situations from the outside (Olwig and Hastrup, 1997, 1-13). To create an 
emotional distance to the people you are studying has been described as important in order to 
achieve objectivity (Cerwonka, 2007, 33). In that one uses oneself as a tool it is not always 
easy to create a distance, and all the easier to get involved. A researcher, often unconsciously, 
selects what to observe, how to record observations and how to interpret observations based 
on personal reference points and experiences.  
Doing ethnographic research, you could say the researcher is in a liminal state. The 
researcher is “separated from his own culture yet not incorporated into the host culture” 
(Johnson 1984, in Robben and Sluka, 2007, 76). We are at the same time participating in the 
culture and observing the culture. The researcher must consider the self in relation to others 
and his or her positioning in the culture being studied. 
In many cases, greater participation in the group being studied can lead to increased 
access to cultural information and greater in-group understanding of experiences within the 
culture. However, increased participation also blurs the role of the researcher in data 
collection and analysis. Often a researcher that engages in fieldwork as a "participant" or 
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"participant-observer" occupies a liminal state where he or she is a part of the culture, but also 
separated from the culture as a researcher. This liminal state of being betwixt and between is 
emotional and uncomfortable as the researcher uses self-reflexivity to interpret field 
observations and interviews. 
 
 
URBAN FIELDWORK: SEOUL, MY FIELDSITE 
 
In traditional anthropology one would research a smaller community and undiscovered parts 
of the world. According to Kathinka Frøystad "urban anthropologists will never get an 
overview of all the inhabitants and their tasks, no matter how many years they are in the 
field8” (2003, 45-46, my translation). Frøystad argues that because of this, the anthropologist 
will narrow down the field location instead, either by investigating a certain theme, network, 
or geography.  
My field had some methodological limitations in the form of many impressions and 
lots of information, a sense of a messy and chaotic city where I constantly strove to define and 
go out and "grab the field." To do fieldwork in a city can be confusing and it can be difficult 
to know where to start to get in touch with someone who will be your future informants. 
Because I was after a specific group of people, it took about one month to get my first 
informant. Seoul is where most defectors live so it was natural to choose the field site, 
although an urban metropolis offers its challenges. Most North Korean refugees want to stay 
in Seoul, because in North Korea, the capital Pyongyang is only for the elite. All the big Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the Ministry of Unification are also based in Seoul. 
Seoul is a city full of diversity and contrasts with an East-meets-West feeling. High 
rises and flashing neon signs surround traditional old temples, houses and statues, making it a 
contrast between new and old. There is a strong American influence, because American troops 
have been stationed in the country since 1957 due to the threat of North Korea. This megacity 
of almost 10 million people is highly densely populated, with almost twice the population 
density as New York City (World Population Review, 2014). There are always lots of cars and 
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 "byantropologer vil aldri få oversikt over alle innbyggerne og deres gjøremål om de 
er aldri så mange år på feltarbeid” (Frøystad, 2003, 45-46). 
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people in the streets. There is a “bballi bballi” 9 (hurry hurry) mentality, and things have to get 
done in a quick manner. Businessmen dressed in suits, old grandmothers and school children 
all push and hurry to get to their next destination.  
Infrastructure is very well established in South Korea. Buses, the subway or KTX are 
very clean, convenient and cheap to use. One card, T-money card, can be used to pay for all 
buses, subways, taxis and even items in convenience stores. In terms of technological 
infrastructure, South Korea is ahead of Norway by far. Seoul has one of the fastest Internet in 
the world, and PC cafes are everywhere making it easy for users to relax with a game or do 
business in a spare moment. Many stores, restaurants and cafes are open until morning, and 
some are even open 24/7. New malls and shops are constantly under construction. The shops 
in the city center are flooded with western goods, as well as with local South Korean brands. 
Often I was surprised by the selection range that could surpass what I find in Norway. In most 
grocery stores there were more shelf space for choice in meat, imported beers, wines and 
fruits. A common perception is that everything that comes from the West is good and has high 
quality, especially goods from Western Europe and the USA. Although the Korean peninsula 
has only been divided for six decades, the development of South Korea compared to North 
Korea is extreme.  
 
 
ORGANIZING MY FIELDWORK 
 
North Koreans and South Koreans are of the same ethnicity, and therefore appearance-wise 
they look the same. Being a specific group of people that blends in with the host country, it is 
harder to differentiate who is from the North and South just by visual cues. As North Koreans 
have become a rather marginalized and stigmatized group in Seoul, I thought by seeking out 
specific places where they reside and roam about would bring me into contact with a bigger 
group of defectors. I spent my first month getting to know Seoul, learning more Korean and 
waiting for replies to my e-mails. I wanted to use a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) 
as a starting base. I was in contact with a NGO before I left for my fieldwork, and felt very 
optimistic about them helping me in my fieldwork. Their goal is to improve the situation of 
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defectors in South Korea. This specific NGO offers educational programs and activities for 
defectors; especially interesting is the English tutoring and activity program. They have a rich 
base of defectors, making the NGO a rather big organization for North Korean defectors. 
Sadly, when I met with the NGO they were not enthusiastic anymore. But they helped me get 
my first informant, who also became my main informant, “Sulli” and her family. I also 
thought about visiting Hanawon, but for security reasons, only clarified persons were allowed 
inside. To be an aspiring social anthropologist was not enough to get me through the gate, 
which I find understandable. 
 
 
METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS  
 
In my choice of topic there were obvious ethical concerns, as North Korean defectors have 
sensitive information they may not want to disclose. When I met with my potential informants 
I wanted to present the purpose of the research and also get consent from the informants. The 
refugees accepted that I spent time with them, and it was very important to me that they 
would understand my intentions, and that no one would feel cheated. I explained as best I 
could why I was in South Korea, who I was and what I studied in order to avoid 
misunderstandings. I tried to be as clear as possible that I was a student, not a journalist or 
affiliated with aid organizations. I told them that participation was voluntary, and that they 
were allowed to withdraw at any time during the research process. At times I was still unsure 
whether the refugees had understood. The concept of participant observation was something 
my informants did not understand completely even when I explained it many times. 
Whenever they said they were going shopping, to the grocery store or on other “trivial” trips 
somewhere they did not think I would like to go, I immediately asked if I could join them.  
I planned to gather material through participant observation supplemented with 
interviews (Bernard 1994a; Bernard 1994b). I have also availed myself of semi-structured 
interviews, where I have wanted more information on various topics. During the first half of 
my fieldwork in Seoul I met my informants either at their home or at local cafés. Because I 
was doing fieldwork in an urban setting it was difficult to follow my informants everywhere, 
and I had to set up appointments to see them. Naturally because of that I ended up with a lot 
of unstructured interviews (Bernard 1994b), “deep hanging out” (Geertz 1998) and having 
conversations about what interested them. I had to use the time I got with them well. I got to 
use the “go-along” method (Kusenbach 2003), getting an understanding of their spatial 
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practices and environmental perceptions. I followed my informants in their daily chores, such 
as when they had errands to shop and markets with neighbors and family. Through many 
everyday conversations I got an insight into different problems and challenges everyday has 
to offer. I participated in social and cultural life in the capital by going to cafés, restaurants, 
church, a road trip, and other excursions and leisure activities.  
I wanted to use the method of “snowball” sampling to get a better understanding of the 
refugees’ daily lives in Seoul, and of whom their networks consisted of. The “snowballing” 
method is often used in anthropological field research and is “particularly applicable when the 
focus of study is on a sensitive issue, possibly concerning a relatively private matter, and thus 
requires the knowledge of insiders to locate people for study” (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981, 
141). But I found out that the informants I had decided to separate themselves from other 
defectors and wanted either South Korean friends or international friends. I discovered this 
after I had persistently tried to get in contact with other potential informants, but my already 
current informants were not interested in it. Actually they were more interested in my network 
as a person who had recently moved to South Korea and how I managed to get friends.  
Hence, I became more proactive and started seeking out other arenas where defectors 
might be found. I started to follow the newsletters of all the big North Korean related NGOs, 
and found out that many of them arranged events where defectors would come and speak. 
These events were aimed at an English speaking or understanding audience, so more often 
than not the defector spoke English. Considering their background, their English was very 
good. And what separated them out from other defectors was that they wanted to talk about 
their stories. In hindsight this was both positive and negative. The defectors were usually 
young, around 20-30 years old. After the events ended I went up to the defector asking if there 
was a chance I could meet with them at a later opportunity. Most of them were happy to hear 
about my project and wanted to join. So by attending events about human rights in North 
Korea I got informants. At the end of my fieldwork I had seven informants and got the 
opportunity to meet with Shin Dong-hyuk10 and Kang Chol-hwan11. 
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 Introduced in the “Introduction” regarding the book “Escape from Camp 14”. 
 
11 
  
 Whose story we learn of in the book “Aquariums of Pyongyang”. 
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I rarely sat with my notebook when I was in the field. The times I had the book in 
front of me, the conversations were very unnatural and I felt that it affected how they 
behaved. However, I had a small glossary to learn Korean which came in handy for noting 
some keywords. I did not use a tape recorder because it might have been a hindrance in 
having a natural conversation. During my interview with “Namnam Buknyeo”, a marriage-
matching agency was the only time I used structured interview and an interpreter. I got their 
consent to use a tape recorder to record our interview. In other cases, citations from my 
informants are not necessarily a one hundred percent accurate reproduction of what my 
informants said. Since I did not use a tape recorder, or have written down more than small 
notes during our meetings, it is not certain that all statements are verbatim. I nevertheless 
believe that the citations are approximately accurate and bring forward what my informants 
have said. All field notes were written shortly after the actual meeting, with everything still 
fresh in memory.  
As an observer from the outside, one may interpret any event, large or small in a 
different way than what the locals do, sometimes jumping to wrong conclusions. A measure to 
hinder this to some extent is to use thick description, describing the happenings in detail. 
There are many ways one may misinterpret what one sees in the field by not having sufficient 
knowledge about what one observes. Clifford Geertz in “Thick Description: Toward an 
interpretive theory of culture” (1973) suggests that writing thick descriptions as outsiders may 
hinder confusions and wrong understandings, especially when a third part reads the 
descriptions. Writing detailed descriptions may increase the chance to give a fair description 
of what one observes, diminishing the possibility for misinterpretations of the happenings. 
The data and analyses I present are the aspects of my empirical data which I perceive as 
relevant, and where I have had a sense of regularity in what I have observed. Simultaneously 
my thesis is based on my personal understanding and subjective interpretation of interaction, 
statements and events that took place.  
To keep in contact with my informants I refrained from using Facebook. None of my 
informants are “friends” with me on Facebook. I instead used Kakaotalk to keep in contact 
with my informants. Kakaotalk is a free application for smartphones with free texting and free 
call features when connected to internet. In addition, users can share information from photos, 
videos, URL links and more to stay connected. Kakaotalk is the leading communication tool 
in South Korea at the moment (Kakaotalk n.d.). At Kakaotalk others cannot see who you are 
talking with or any information about who is on your friend list, keeping the anonymity of my 
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informants. It is very common in Korea for people to ask for your Kakaotalk ID rather than 
your Facebook name.  
Following the anthropological code of ethics I did my best to anonymize my 
informants from our first meeting. In this thesis I have obscured the identity of my informants 
to protect them, as well as keeping the confidentiality of the collected material. All my 
informants were anonymized using pseudo names from the start, and I tried to give them 
“Western” names. The names were chosen at random.  
 
 
LANGUAGE  
 
Before I left for my fieldwork I tried to learn Korean, Hangul, the national language of both 
South and North Korea. Hangul is a comprehensive language system, considered to have one 
of the most scientific writing systems in the world. Korean is generally considered to be one 
of the most difficult languages to learn and become fluent in. However, learning the basics is 
relatively easy, particularly in comparison with other Asian languages. I had previously 
learned to speak Thai, but discovered that Korean was much easier to learn. The Korean 
writing system is alphabetic and can be learned quickly. Unlike Thai and Chinese, Korean has 
no tones and few pronunciation variations. The dialect spoken in and around Seoul is 
considered standard Korean (Savada and Shaw 1990a).  
When I arrived in Seoul I signed up at YBM, Korea’s largest language school, which I 
attended during February and March. Trying to learn Korean was a great advantage in more 
ways than I had envisioned. Refugees were more positive to me initially, and they enjoyed 
when I could greet them in their own language. It was thus easier to connect with people, and 
it also created great curiosity. An additional benefit was that I had an excuse to be able to sit 
with a notebook where I could jot down words and other key elements without too many 
questions. I was never so good in Korean that I could understand the whole conversation, but 
I could pick up what the conversation was about, and it was thus easier to ask follow-up 
questions. I also learned how to differentiate between the Seoulite accent and the North 
Korean accent.  
I considered in the beginning of the fieldwork to use an interpreter, but realized that I 
managed well without one. Because of the situation of defectors I felt that bringing in another 
person, most likely a South Korean, would make the potential relationship difficult as they 
would have to get to “know” two persons. Also having an interpreter could cause problems as 
28 
there would be a person functioning as an intermediary between my informants and I. 
Information may be adhered or subtracted by the interpreter.  
Gerald Berreman experienced the difficulties an assistant or interpreter may have 
during the fieldwork. Berreman were doing fieldwork in North India and had hired a Brahmin 
assistant. This led to him having many high-caste informants, while lower-caste people kept 
reticent, primarily “because one of us was a Brahmin and we were closely identified with the 
powerful high-caste villagers” (Berreman, 1963, 144). After a while the Brahmin assistant 
became ill, and Berreman had to hire another. This time he hired a Muslim, “a ritually 
polluted individual”, leading them to get informants of lower-caste (Berreman, 1963, 146). 
While the Brahmin assistant had to keep his status as a person of higher-class during all times, 
and wanted to give Berreman a good perception of India, the Muslim assistant had no such 
obligations. 
I tried to find informants who could speak and understand English. This went very 
well with the informants I had met at North Korea related events. But with “Sulli” whom I 
had met through the NGO it was difficult at times. When we talked about difficult subjects, 
“Sulli” had a hard time to express herself fully in English so we relied on Google Translate or 
Naver12 translate to help us. Naver Translate also gave suggestions as how to use the word in a 
sentence so Sulli would scroll down until she found the one fitting for what she wanted to 
express. Likewise, when I said a word that she did not understand completely I would 
translate it using one of the translators on our smartphones and she would have a better 
understanding. The problem of translation has been problematized in anthropology by 
Clifford Geertz (1974) and Roger Keesing (1985). Axel Borchgrevink (2003: 106) points out 
that there are many challenges associated with translations since language is not just words, 
but are wrapped together with cultural ideas and social interaction. I see it as an advantage 
that I was present and could thus also do my best to understand the situation. John Christian 
Knudsen says that: 
 
“As researchers, as well as other professionals, we have to try to reduce the danger of 
misinterpreting, or misreading, other people’s talk in our quest for cultural, or diagnostically, 
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 Naver is one of the most popular search portals in South Korea. 
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exotica (Keesing 1989). We should keep in mind the point made by Devereux (1967: xix) that 
the data of behavioral science are always threefold:  
1. The behavior of the subject. 2. The “disturbances” produced by the existence and 
observational activities of the observer. 3. The behavior of the observer: his anxieties, his 
defense maneuvers, his research strategies, his “decisions” (= his attribution of a meaning 
to his observations)” (Knudsen, 1990, 122-123). 
 
Not speaking Korean fluently sometimes worked to my benefit, making my informants 
explain words, expressions and hidden meaning for me to understand. There is an extensive 
use of honorifics between speaker and audience to differentiate seniority, superiority and 
inferiority. The proper use of words and polite language is a subtle matter in which my 
informants tried their best to teach me. Hierarchical nuances are hard for an outsider to grasp. 
But because they use honorifics it is easier to tell when you become close with someone in the 
way they address you such as dropping the formal speech.  
 
 
MY ROLE IN THE FIELD  
 
It was in the beginning difficult to determine what role I should have among the refugees. I 
was afraid that my background as a young foreign woman would affect how my informants 
would establish relationships with me. There are the obvious aesthetic differences that made it 
impossible for me to disappear in the crowd. Caucasian foreigners in South Korea are thought 
of as either American military soldiers or English teachers working at the after school 
institutions, “hagwon”. I wanted to come off as a friend and a person they could confide in. In 
fact a few of them said they related to me because I was “alone in a new country without any 
friends” and also since I could not speak Korean fluently they said that I was “lost” just like 
how they initially were. They took pride in helping me with my Korean homework, and were 
intrigued that I as a foreigner was interested in North Korea, and the North Korean people. 
They saw that I wanted to learn about them, their language, eat their food and learn more 
about their culture. Sometimes they asked where and with whom I spent my days when I was 
not with them.  
 
 
TRUST 
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As non-Korean, I felt they could vent more easily to me about their difficulties. I thought 
about the possible apprehensiveness defectors might feel if a South Korean was to hear their 
complaints, if there were any. I feel that especially immigrants are expected to pledge 
allegiance to the nation they live in, and not the "homeland." Dana, a young defector in her 
early twenties, said to me during the time of the Sewol accident13, that the South Korean 
government was too slow to react and help. She finished off by saying “The North Korean 
government would have reacted faster.” As this were a sensitive subject in South Korea at the 
time, and still is, if a South Korean heard how Dana felt, that person would maybe feel hurt.  
On my second meeting with Sulli she gave me the codes to their apartment complex 
and their front door. Almost every house in South Korea has the technology that you only 
need to press a four digit digital code to get inside your entrance door. They do not use keys. 
This code works as a key, and giving it to what was practically a stranger after meeting with 
her twice shows how trusting she was. This way, when I wanted to go into their home 
whenever I felt convenient, it was possible. When I first arrived in Seoul I stayed with my 
close friend for one week before moving into my own apartment, and I did not get her code to 
her apartment.  
One day, Sulli, her husband, Jenny, Halmoni, and I were having dinner to celebrate 
Sulli’s husband’s birthday. Sulli had bought Coca-Cola and had pizza delivered. After a few 
glasses of Coca-Cola she gives a loud burp. I did not think too much of it at the time, until she 
told me the following day that her husband scolded her for doing so in front of me. She 
wanted to know if I was offended by her doing so, which I was not. She said she had brushed 
it off because “We are very good friends”.  
Approaching the end of my fieldwork, my female informants knowing I was soon to 
leave, suddenly took up the habit of linking arms with me when we were out. Holding hands 
and linking arms is a sign of affection. It is common to see both women and men showing 
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 The Sewol accident in April 2014 happened when the Sewol ferry going from Seoul 
to Jeju island capsized, trapping almost all the passengers inside. The tragedy was that it was 
mostly secondary school students on their way on a fieldtrip who were trapped inside. 304 of 
476 people died, and it spurred huge criticism of how the South Korean government 
responded, along with criticism of media coverage, and the actions of the captain of the ferry. 
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public displays of affection towards their same sex friends. But, public display of affection 
towards the opposite sex and between couples is very rare in a still conservative country.  
 
 
CAFÉS AS FIELDSITE 
 
In this thesis I wish to point to examples of how life can manifest itself in South Korea for my 
informants and friends. The empirical data are largely from informal conversations centered 
around everyday activities, conversations around the kitchen table and cafés. Cafés became an 
important “place” for my fieldwork. Most of my informants wanted to meet there, which 
meant that it became an arena for interaction. I would mostly meet my informants at a quiet 
café over a cup of hot or cold beverage. My informants lived for the most part either alone, 
with one or both parents or siblings. They hardly invited me to their apartments, except Sulli 
who always invited me to visit her at home.  
They wanted to meet at cafés or restaurants, like they would usually interact with a 
friend. One thing that you notice about the streets of Seoul is that cafés are incredibly popular. 
Multiple cafés reside on the same streets, and often times, they are several stories tall. The 
most amazing part is they always seem busy.  
 
Koreans like to gather together and tend to say ‘Do you want to have a cup tea or coffee?’ 
when they want to have a talk with somebody” (Interviewee 8). So whenever they meet their 
friends or colleagues, they usually do so at cafés (Jang, 2012, 15). 
 
When I met with my informants I would send them a Kakaotalk message asking where they 
wanted to meet, and they would send me the location and name of the café through 
Kakaotalk. Coffee culture in South Korea has exploded during the last decade. After the 
establishment of Starbucks in 1999 it became the drink of the masses:  
 
However, according to Seoul Cyber Enterprise Exhibition website, there were approximately 
800 cafés in Korea’s capital city Seoul in 2004. By 2011, there were 12,381 cafés in Korea; 
this is 54% increase in the number compared to the number of cafés in the previous year 
(Jang, 2012, 1).  
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Jang Jung-hee in “Korean Café Culture: What Korean Cafés Mean to Koreans” (2012) 
stresses that cafes are social places. Like China and Japan, Korea is strongly relationship-
based. Individuals like doing activities with others. Because most young adults in South 
Korea live with their families until they get married, cafés are a good place to sit and talk on a 
date without their parents around. The restriction on independent living arrangements being 
too expensive, these cafés are spaces where the younger generation felt comfortable.  
 
A set of contributing factors includes speedy modernization, population density, sensitivity to 
trends, couple culture, emphasis on entertainment, and cultural notions – for example, 
collectivism and Confucianism (Jang, 2012, 12).  
 
Going to cafés has become a habit, and it is common to visit one before or after a meal. These 
establishments with their affordable price range and selection appeal to the younger 
generation as they exert an image of consumption. In South Korea, eating and drinking is 
considered a social event:  
 
People go to cafés to interact with others. In the U.S., a lot of people visit cafés alone and tend 
to use laptops or mobile phones even when they are with someone. However, in Korea, it is a 
little strange to see people stay at a café alone (Jang, 2012, 12). 
 
To be able to enjoy such “leisure consumption” participants need to have the means for it. I 
wished the refugees would get something in return for spending time with me. In return for 
their time I sometimes bought sweets and bakery goods as a thank you, and I would offer to 
pay for their drinks.  
 
 
 
 
 
ETHICAL PROBLEMS DURING THE FIELDWORK  
 
When I met with Sulli and her family we decided that our relationship would a reciprocal one, 
where I taught English to Jenny, Sulli’s teenage daughter, and afterwards Sulli would help me 
with my thesis. English proficiency is very important in South Korea, and many pay for 
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private tutoring after school. It was a reciprocal deal that would benefit both parts, without 
any financial cost. Whenever I would go to Sulli’s house I would get something to drink, 
fruits and snacks. Fruit in South Korea is very expensive so I was very thankful.  
The French social scientist Marcel Mauss in “The Gift” (2002), discusses how the gift 
creates reciprocal social obligations and ties within a group. The gift could also establish 
peaceful and friendly relations with outsiders. A gift creates an expectation of one form or 
another for reciprocity - sooner or later. And I had two episodes with “Sulli” concerning 
offerings of gifts.  
 
 
The kimchi cabbage head 
 
At my second meeting with Sulli I made a mistake. It was around 7PM, and Sulli asked me 
what I like to eat for breakfast since I was a “waykokin”14, a foreigner. I told her that I 
preferred cereal with milk. She then asked if I liked kimchi15. Which I said I do like. She 
immediately went to her kitchen and into her kimchi refrigerator16. She packs a whole kimchi 
cabbage head in a Tupperware box and suggests I take it home and eat it the next day for 
breakfast with rice. Sadly I do not take the hint to leave with my kimchi, and I suggested we 
eat it together now. Knowing how eating food is considered a social interaction between 
people in South Korea, I felt we would get a better connection if we had a meal together. 
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  외국인 
 
15 
  
 Kimchi is fermented cabbage, or other vegetables along with a variety of seasoning, 
and it is Korea’s staple food. It is considered spicy or sour. It is eaten with every meal, either 
as a side dish or as one of the main components in a main dish. However, kimchi is always on 
the table. 
 
16 
  
 Many Koreans have their own kimchi refrigerator since kimchi may contaminate 
other foods with its smell. The fridge is designed specifically to store kimchi, controlling the 
temperature and the fermentation process. 
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People are brought into the same community by sharing the eating act, writes Lupton (1996, 
25). By taking in the food's qualities a person will be included in a culinary system and thus 
one also becomes a member of a social group. Food as such helps to highlight differences 
between cultures and helps to strengthen a group's identity (Lupton, 1996, 25).  
 However, since it was our second meeting I did not know that the whole family eats 
together when Jenny and Sulli’s husband comes home from private tutoring and work at 
around nine o’clock. Sulli accepts my request to eat together, and makes fried fresh mackerel 
and vegetable soup for me. Jenny arrives home at 8PM and to her surprise we are eating. I ask 
her if she is hungry too, and she says no, but will be in about one hour. Around 9PM when we 
are finished eating and talking, Sulli’s husband comes home and it is my first time meeting 
him. I realize my mistake and try to escape the situation. He went to change to more 
comfortable clothes and asks me if I had eaten. I say my goodbye as Sulli again prepares food 
for her family.  
 
The New Balance shoes 
 
After going to their apartment three times a week for two months, there was an episode. Sulli 
was on her smartphone and browsing an online store. After seeing me for a while she knew 
which colors I liked to wear - I wore a bright pink wool coat and matching scarf. She asked 
me which shoe size I was, and I told her size 36, but afterwards became curious about what 
she was doing. Korea has their own sizing system so she asked again which size in Korean 
sizes. I now realized that she was buying shoes for me online. I asked her and she said she 
was buying me a gift and showed me a pair of pink New Balance shoes17. When I told her I 
did not want or needed them she was taken aback. Did I not want this generous present from 
her? She told me “I am grateful for you teaching “Jenny” and being our friend.”  
Mauss describes how “To refuse to give, to fail to invite, just as to refuse to accept, is 
tantamount to declaring war; it is to reject the bond of alliance and commonality” (Mauss, 
2002, 17). A gift is not only a gift. The whole purpose of exchanging gifts is to create a 
community. It is not just an impersonal exchange of objects, it is a way to establish and 
                                                          
17 
  
 They were retailing for 130000 won, about 130$ or 900 NOK. 
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maintain connections between people. Because giving and receiving gifts is an act loaded 
with social meaning, to refuse to give or refuse to receive is also meaningful. The gift 
involves three forms of commitment: to give, to receive, and to provide a return gift. More 
than the actual exchange of goods or services over time the gift is also a statement about the 
relationship between the giver and receiver. It creates, confirms and symbolizes mutual social 
dependence and is socially integrative (Mauss, 2002). Although Sulli did not want to buy 
them for me online, she sent me a Kakaotalk message a month later asking me to meet her at 
Gasan Digital Complex, a big shopping area. She did not want to take no for an answer and 
wanted me to pick some shoes for myself, on her treat. Although we did not buy anything, we 
became closer over the issue.  
 
LAUGHTER OUT OF PLACE 
 
Something that struck me when I was talking to my informants was their ability to always 
laugh, make jokes and smile when we were talking about North Korea and also their 
challenges in South Korea. At our first meeting Sulli was walking me back to the subway 
station, and at that time she asked me if I wanted to know why she escaped North Korea. 
She was joking and laughing about how in North Korea you would get killed if you talked too 
much, and then shows with body language what she means. She moves her mouth excessively 
without any sound coming out and at the same time horizontally drags her thumb with her fist 
clenched over her throat. She gives a small laugh after.  
In Donna M. Goldstein’s monograph “Laughter out of place” (2003) she helps us to 
understand that joking and laughter is part of a frustration towards the political and economic 
desperation among residents of the shantytown. Goldstein’s material is about women in the 
favelas in a Rio shantytown in Brazil. It is about absurdist and black humor that people 
generate amid daily conditions of humiliation, anger, and despair.  
 
Despite the fact that I was caught up in a community where life was all too clearly very hard, 
everywhere I turned I seemed to hear laughter. I gradually came to realize, first in my gut, later 
in my head, that there was much more behind the humor than I first realized. This humor was 
a kind of running commentary about the political and economic structures that made up the 
context within the people of Rio’s shantytowns made their lives- an indirect dialogue, 
sometimes critical, often ambivalent, always (at least partially) hidden, about the 
contradictions of poverty in the midst of late capitalism (Goldstein, 2003, 2). 
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Her monograph tells us how her informants would laugh at something that to Goldstein 
seemed sad and incomprehensible. After a while she began to see the social patterns to this 
“laughter out of place”, and how it was used as a mechanism, like a shield to cope with their 
own situation. The use of humor had a purpose. As for my own informants it was often Sulli 
who would laugh and joke when she talked about stories that were hard for her to tell. Late in 
the fieldwork I was invited to Sulli’s house for dinner. While she was chopping up vegetables 
she suddenly says that she saw “many bad things in Bukhan18 (North Korea)”. She told me 
about the public executions in her hometown that she had seen when she was younger. She 
was standing with her back towards me. I was seated at the dining table (which they only use 
when I am at the house). I could not see her face, but I could hear her clearly. Her voice was 
clear as she was talking about how small children down to five years old were present. And 
then she laughs. It was very hard for me not to show my emotions, and we became silent for a 
minute. The use of humor should not be understood to mean that death or terrible situations 
are less devastating, but that it is used as Goldstein explained, as a mechanism to cope with 
the situation: “The meanings embedded in humor are often elusive, hard to grasp, fugitive” 
(Goldstein, 2003, 3).  
John Christian Knudsen in his work with refugees in Vietnam, Norway and The 
United States explains that sometimes focusing on humorous episodes and not on the daily 
suffering was helpful for the refugees he studied. His informants would laugh at experiences 
in a “de-personalized manner” focusing on the humor (Knudsen, 1990, 130-131). When I 
asked my informants if they experienced any culture shock arriving in South Korea, they all 
had stories they wanted to share. When I talked to Victoria she told me about how when she 
arrived in South Korea it was her first experience with a Western sit-down toilet. She had only 
used squat toilets previously. She explained how during her interrogation with the South 
Korean Intelligence Service she had to use the bathroom. She climbed up the toilet to use it as 
a squatting toilet. One of the police officers outside waiting for her heard all the noise and 
asked her what she was doing. They “masked” their daily suffering and struggles in 
“humorous” stories. 
                                                          
18 
  
 She used the South Korean name for North Korea; “Bukhan”, not the North Korean 
name; “Choson”. 
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 It is important for me to point out that these are stories told to me by my informants. 
The events from North Korea and on their journey to South Korea I did not see with my own 
eyes. But I believe their stories to be true. There is no way to verify the stories because I 
cannot go back in time, and also I could not raise questions about their credibility because to 
do so would signal that I do not believe their stories.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
Historical context and the journey from North to South 
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The purpose of this chapter is to provide context and background. It is about the history of 
North Korea, the songbun class system of North Korea and how defectors escape from North 
Korea. There are many routes a defector can take from North Korea, to China and then to 
South Korea. It is important to create an image of what the refugees have escaped from, and at 
which situation they have arrived. 
 
 
UNDERSTANDING NORTH KOREA  
 
The two Koreas have shared a common language, ethnicity, history, and culture until the past 
70 years. The partitioning of a single Korean nation into two opposing nation-states in 1948 
led to the construction of nationalism in each “with the other state and its people serving as a 
mirror image” (Choo 2006, 581). North Korea prides itself with being a predominantly 
homogenous ethnic population with a unique language and culture which has not been 
“polluted” by foreigners, which they say South Korea has been and currently is. Indeed, North 
Korean propaganda officially states that people in the DPRK are “as pure as the water they 
drink,” while in the South people are “polluted” in every way, “decaying from where the 
American sewage has seeped in” (Myers, 2010, 155). The two Koreas on each side of the 
DMZ have diverged so much that the people are now strangers to each other. The economies 
of the two Koreas are a bipolar difference which is the result of their different political 
systems. During the first decades after the Korean War however, North Korea experienced 
great economic growth and its overall situation was better than that of its neighbor to the 
south. But this progress was short-lived. While South Korea is thriving in a capitalist 
economy, North Korea is struggling with a socialist economy.  
 
A nation’s development is commonly described in terms of movement (some might say 
“progress”) along such dimensions as tradition versus modernity, agrarian versus industrial 
society, monarchic versus democratic parliamentary governance, closed versus open borders, 
and colonialism versus independence. North Korea has failed to develop along many of these 
lines (Oh and Hassig, 2000, 1).  
 
North Korea’s history starts with Kim Il Sung, “The Great Leader”, being appointed premier 
in 1948. North Korea is a mountainous country which share borders with China, Russia and 
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South Korea via the DMZ. It is a country of 25 million people (Ministry of Unification n.d. 
b). Kim Il Sung introduced a planned and centralized control over the economy and politics, 
and the “songbun” stratified social class system. Songbun will be explained in more detail in 
the following section. Adhering to communist ideology, North Korea values manual labor, 
free healthcare and free education. Healthcare is supposedly available for everyone, but those 
living in Pyongyang have the opportunity to go to better equipped hospitals than those 
residing outside of the capital. There are eleven years of compulsory schooling - controlled by 
the state. The curriculum includes both academic and political themes. According to the 
constitution people have freedom of religion, but in practice it is not true.  
 
The North Korean people have been woefully deprived of the opportunity to advance socially 
and politically. When the Choson dynasty collapsed, Japan immediately took control over 
Korea, instituting its own autocratic regime. When the Japanese left, Kim Il Sung imported 
Stalinism. The North Korean people were never challenged to think for themselves (Oh and 
Hassig, 2000, 9). 
 
Kim Il Sung introduced a Stalinist socialist rule with emphasis on the “Juche” 
ideology. The Juche ideology of Kim Il Sung is the idealization of being self-sufficient, and 
the society must take priority over the individual. Economic inequality should be combated. 
North Korea has since its inception received international assistance, largely financial help 
from China and the Soviet Union. But after the Cold War and Soviet dissolution in 1991, the 
country has been dependent on international humanitarian aid, mainly from South Korea and 
the United States. One could claim North Korea’s motto of self-sufficiency is ironic as they 
have received international assistance since the beginning of its existence.  
North Korea has a one-party political system (Human Rights Watch n.d.). The Korean 
Worker’s Party (hereby KWP) is the dominant political party in North Korea. About 99% of 
those living in Pyongyang are members of the Party (Collins, 2012, 69). Attaining party 
membership is seen as a big step to personal and family success. There are elections every 
five years, with unanimous support to the KWP with 99% percent of the votes (Hassig and 
Oh, 2009, 196).  
 
 
SONGBUN - NORTH KOREAS STRATIFIED CLASS SYSTEM   
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Songbun is the stratified socio-political class system according to which all North Koreans are 
ranked19. Songbun, which can be translated to mean “ingredients” or “material”, is one of the 
Kim regime’s prime social control tools (Collins, 2012, 6; Park Sookel J. 2012). As North 
Korea is a totalitarian20 regime, one of the few left in the world, it uses different tools to keep 
oppressing and controlling its population. Songbun was established in 1957 by Kim Il-sung 
(Harden, 2012, 42-43). It can be compared superficially to the Indian caste system and the 
South African Apartheid system. The songbun system can be compared to the Indian caste 
system in that from birth there is a classification based on perceived loyalty of your parents to 
the regime, while caste is based on the perceived purity of your family. The caste system is 
based on a binary opposition of pure and impure according to Louis Dumont (Rio and Smedal 
(2008). In this hierarchy the pure is given superiority over the impure, and the two must be 
kept separate. Songbun divides the population according to the actions, occupation and status 
of their patrilineal relatives during the Japanese colonial period and Korean War. Songbun 
status derives from the father's, or grandfather’s background. There is thus classification by 
birth, which seems peculiar for a communist country that supposedly values egalitarianism. 
The report “Marked for life: Songbun” by Robert Collins (2012) describes songbun as a 
system of discrimination by the state and categorizes citizens according to ancestral and social 
standings. Songbun is based on a persons perceived loyalty to the regime. It justifies the 
elimination of political opponents:  
 
It is one of the major political tools (along with state terror, pervasive state surveillance, and 
state-controlled socio-economic resource allocation), by which the Kim regime controls 
society. The discrimination created by songbun ensures politically-directed denial of the right 
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 There are two types of songbun: “chulsin songbun,” or songbun based on origins, 
which refers to the socio-economic background of one’s family, including that of one’s 
parents, siblings, grandparents, uncles, aunts, and cousins; and “sahoe songbun,” or societal 
songbun, which refers to one’s individual socio-political and economic behavior and 
performance (Collins, 2012). 
 
20 
  
 “A totalitarian regime in this context may be defined as a government where every 
aspect of human life is controlled and ordered by the state to further the political objectives of 
the ruling elite.” (Collins, 2012, foreword 7) 
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to make many of the decisions other countries assume to be a matter of individual prerogative 
- one’s occupation, spouse, housing, education, and medical treatment (Collins, 2012, 87). 
 
The reason why I want to give a clear explanation of songbun, is that this classification 
system has repercussions for those who decide to defect North Korea. People are 
disadvantaged through no fault of their own. Because most defectors arriving in South Korea 
over the last decade come from a low social stratum were denied university education or a 
chance in another job than their paternal side of the family, adapting to South Korean society 
is harder for them than for those from upper songbun class. At the end of this chapter I will 
highlight two life stories from my informants, demostrating how songbun has affected their 
life in South Korea. 
Songbun divides the population into three main classes, with 51 subcategories. People 
are ranked based on their conceived trustworthiness and political loyalty to the Kim family 
and the North Korean state: 
 
The institution of songbun means that each and every North Korean citizen is assigned a 
heredity-based class and socio-political rank over which the individual exercises no control 
but which determines all aspects of his or her life. Under this classification system, all citizens 
become part of one of three designated classes - the “core” or loyal class, the “wavering” 
class, or the “hostile” class (Collins, 2012, 1). 
 
Songbun segregates the population geographically. In this way it can be compared to the 
South African Apartheid system, which was a system where the state enforced through 
legislation that the majority of the population to be racially segregated according to ethnicity. 
The core class in North Korea has the opportunity to live in and around the capital 
Pyongyang. The wavering class is settled outside the capital, while the hostile class lives in 
the outskirts of the country, in brutal natural environments. Those who oppose the regime 
might risk being sentenced to live in concentration camps, known as kwan-li-so, under 
horrific conditions (Human Rights Watch n.d.). People of the core class are considered elite or 
budding elite. The people in the “core” (haeksim) class are KWP members, loyalist to the 
revolution and the regime, and are those who get significant privileges such as the opportunity 
to live in Pyongyang (Collins, 2012, 6-7). The majority of the population however constitutes 
of the wavering class. Those in the “wavering” (dongyo) class are those deemed questionable 
in terms of loyalty to the regime, but who can demonstrate their loyalty by working hard 
42 
economically and show a good political performance (Collins, 2012, 7). The lowest level 
class, the “hostile” (choktae) class, consists of those perceived as being disloyal to the regime, 
the party and the Kim family. They are regarded as “enemies of the state”, “politically 
unredeemable” and “impure elements” (Collins, 2012, 7). Because of this they suffer the most 
in the North Korean society: 
Kim Il-sung reengineered North Korean society so as to make the work unit the basic social 
element. Food distribution was tied to the workplace. Being of lower songbun meant being 
assigned to menial jobs that were labor intensive in heavy industry, mining, or agriculture. 
Quitting such jobs was unthinkable, because not reporting to your workplace meant that you 
not only would not receive your food ration, but might lose your housing associated with that 
work unit (Collins, 2012, 57).  
 
As the majority of the defectors arriving in South Korea are from the northern parts of North 
Korea, this correlates with their low songbun status (Collins, 2012, 68-69). The Northern 
provinces are predominantly populated by those deemed “enemies of the state”. The people of 
the hostile class were moved to the “Siberia” of North Korea, an isolated mountain area, since 
the 1940s (Collins, 2012, 67), where the survival opportunities are tough. The famine of the 
1990s hit the hardest here because people were already doing poorly, and had few coping 
mechanisms.  
Songbun is not static, and one can alter one’s status. But what this generally means is 
that one’s songbun can worsen. There are few cases where people have moved up the social 
ladder, because one’s songbun hinges on “one’s family’s pre-revolutionary class status” 
(Collins, 2012, 7). One way to move up social class is actually to meet the leader in person or 
have your picture taken with him. Falling from a good songbun status to a bad songbun status 
is more common. Political crime will not only cause one’s own songbun status to drop, but 
also that of one’s family members up to three generations (Collins, 2012, 7). This can happen 
due to committing offenses, political or criminal, or even by marrying someone with a lower 
songbun status. This happened to Mrs. X. In her testimony to the UN Commission of Inquiry 
in Washington 30
th
 October 2013, she explained how her marriage made her songbun status 
drop (UN Web TV, 2013). She told the Commission that she belonged to the first class, but 
was dropped to the third class. When she got married she acquired the songbun status of her 
husband. Mrs. X jokingly said that she did not know her husband’s songbun was bad, because 
43 
he was such a handsome man. She married him without knowing the fact that he was from a 
bad class.  
The government keeps a secret file on every citizen’s personal conduct and family 
background. My informants remember the atmosphere of distrust and suspicion that separated 
people from each other through the constant fear of surveillance. The omnipresent secret 
security police Bowibu and their informants could in principle always overhear everyone's 
conversations, and this led to self-censorship and suspicion of neighbors and friends. Was 
your neighbor an informant who worked for the Bowibu? Did the neighbor know that you 
listened to the illegal radio station? 
The entire population was afraid of the Bowibu and the “inminban”. All 
neighborhoods have an “inminban”, a neighborhood watch union. Their duty is to report any 
suspicious activity to the North Korean security apparatus. One did not have the courage to 
tell what they really thought because one did not know whether their friends would tell on 
them, or if others overheard. Or, if you talked to someone on the street, you first looked right 
and left, front and behind: “The arbitrariness of the system serves to keep everyone on edge, 
including the most loyal, making them fearful and obedient” (Collins, 2012, 44). The secret 
police produced through monitoring lots of paperwork and folders. Efforts to produce 
documents, and thus political entities, created an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion that 
separated people from each other. 
 
 
COMMUNIST SUCCESSION 
Kim Jong Il inherited control after his father's death in 1994, and continued the personality 
cult surrounding the Kim-family. It was the first hereditary succession in the communist 
world. North Korea is called “The first communist dynasty”, because power has been 
successfully transferred in the family. In 1998 Kim Il Sung, his father, became “The Eternal 
President”, four years after his death (Kang and Rigoulot, 2001). Kim Jong Il introduced the 
“songun”, the “military first” policy. Enormous resources are used to arm the military and 
feed soldiers. The unsuccessful planned economy with a focus on collective farming, lack of 
fertilizer, little modernized agriculture, and natural disasters led to major food shortages and, 
in the 1990s, a great famine (Hassig and Oh, 2009, 26-27). Kim Jong Il was known not to talk 
in public, and to give few appearances. Very few people knew anything about his personal 
life, and many speculated about who was going to take over after he would pass away. The 
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sovereign power position was transferred to Kim Jong-un in 2011, after Kim Jong Il’s death. 
The young leader took over at the age of 32. Many experts on North Korea hoped for a more 
liberal leader, firstly because of his young age and also because he has received education in 
Switzerland. But Kim Jong-un has been busy purging top officials, even his own uncle Jang 
Song-thaek, and amping up the security in border areas. Kim Jong-un is constantly on TV and 
gives many appearances, and on the spot guidance. His wife, Ri Sol-ju is also often by his 
side, smiling and sometimes even touching him in public (Harden, 2012, 53). Kim Jong-un is 
portrayed as a huggable family man, similar to the way Kim Il-sung, his grandfather, was 
portrayed. However, he is not portrayed that way in Western media. Recently the Hollywood 
comedy “The Interview” (2014) by Sony received much attention. The movie shows how the 
US makes fun of Kim Jong-un, and he is portrayed in many unflattering ways. Sony pulled 
the movie because of “terrorism”, which they linked to hacking coming from North Korea. 
They re-released the movie later after pressure from civil society.  
 
INTERNATIONAL MEDIA ON NORTH KOREA  
 
Socialism and the glorification of the regime have left its mark on the life and culture in North 
Korea. Mass media, literature and art are strictly controlled by central authorities who want to 
nurture the cult around the Kim family. North Korean media are heavily censored and there 
are only the state regulated television channel, newspapers and radio channels available 
(Human Rights Watch n.d.). There is no “internet”, but a domestic intranet which is highly 
monitored. State controlled media is the only permitted source of information. Cell phones are 
becoming more popular in the capital, but citizens cannot make international calls. Foreign 
media is not allowed and those bits that are shown on the state media are severely censored. 
Watching unauthorized non-state TV or radio is punishable. Everything that is shown is added 
a good dose of propaganda and state nationalism, praising the Kim family, the socialist 
revolution, and condemning the US, Japan and South Korea. North Korea is largely a mystery 
to the general public of the world: 
 
North Korea gets international attention, but for all the wrong reasons; military provocations, 
nuclear weapons, an atrocious record on human rights, a failing economy and for their 
leadership. To outsiders looking in we get a glimpse of totally outrageous propaganda, 
infallible leadership, unshakable collective solidarity, a society of perfect happiness 
(Armstrong, 2011, 358).  
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Images of nuclear missiles and weapons of mass destruction, military parades, the astonishing 
Arirang shows21, people crying hysterically in front of statues of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-
il, are maybe what the majority of the world thinks about when they hear North Korea. These 
images are conjured up and Western media really have reduced North Korea to a story of 
crazy dictators and nuclear weapons. The international media is concerned about security 
issues and conflict. But in reality the general picture has been stability and it has been that 
way for the past 60 years. There have been a few provocations inflicted on South Korea. This 
was the case in 2010, when North Korea sank the Cheonan, a warship sailing in South Korean 
waters. The sneak submarine attack killed forty-six South Korean sailors. The same year the 
North also shelled a small South Korean island, killing four people (Harden, 2012). In august 
2015 tensions ran high at the Korean Peninsula when South Korea accused the North of 
planting two landmines which maimed two South Korean soldiers at the DMZ. South Korea 
proceeded to use propaganda speakers after a lull of 11 years. Artillery fire were shot from 
both sides, before an agreement was reached to ease tensions.  
The international media are also very interested in the Kim family. They are treated as 
tabloid news. When Kim Jong-Il died in December 2011, overnight Kim Jong-un became 
famous. For weeks the media followed him and his family commenting on their clothes, 
appearance and spreading rumors that Kim Jong-un had had plastic surgery to look more alike 
his grandfather Kim Il-sung. The media angle is more on the leadership and I think few asked 
what this change in leadership would do for the ordinary people of North Korea, how this 
would impact or affect them.  
The impact of the media and their portrayal of North Korea shape how many see the 
country. Although North Korea is trying their best to keep information from the outside from 
coming in, many North Koreans have watched smuggled and illegal movies and dramas. 
Dana told me she watched Titanic, Cinderella, James Bond and other foreign movies in North 
Korea. South Korean dramas are very popular, and some reach the North just months after 
they finished showing in the South. Because of the growing interest in foreign movies, the 
North Korean people’s mindsets are changing as a consequence. They see how people around 
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 Arirang shows are huge theatrical performances, including gymnastics and flashing 
of image boards, by thousands of North Korea citizens.  
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the world also have love, and they can see how even the people portrayed as poor in these 
movies or dramas are considered affluent in North Korea. That was one of the reasons why 
Dana and her family decided to escape. If they didn’t know that there was something better 
out there and better than North Korea they would not take the risk.  
When she watched Titanic she saw there was no propaganda, there was nothing, but 
just a story about people and love. They did not teach about a revolution or anything. “There 
they die for love! They are not talking about North Korea in the movies. They are just talking 
about everyday things.” That curiosity combined with the situation in North Korea lead to 
their escape. I was shocked, having assumed that North Koreans did not have access to 
foreign films at all. She told me there were plenty of foreign films as well as South Korean 
films and dramas. 
Later I asked my other informants if they had watched or heard on the radio of foreign 
movies and dramas. All of them said they had. Titanic was a repeat offender as Sulli and Dana 
not knowing of each other told me that they both had a crush on Leonardo DiCaprio. After 
reading on the subject I have learned that many North Korean defectors arriving in South 
Korea have said they listened, using Chinese made radios, to Chinese and South Korean radio 
stations (Harden, 2012, 163).  
The way they would watch these illegal movies or listen to the radio was during the 
nighttime, closing the curtains and pulling a blanket over their heads so light and sound would 
be trapped inside. They would also use headphones and have the volume at the lowest. Dana 
said they had to be quiet, showing me this by holding her index finger up to her mouth, and 
pointing at the walls. She said that you could not even trust your neighbors, because of the 
inminban. But as the police wanted to catch people watching these “impure recorded visual 
materials” (Harden, 2012, 172) they would resort to other ways to catch these criminals. As 
more and more illegal visual materials came over the border from China, the North Korean 
police became alarmed and came up with a tactic to catch people who watched them: “they 
cut electricity to specific apartment blocks and then raided every apartment to see what tapes 
and disks were stuck inside the players” (Harden, 2012, 164).  
 
INFORMATION BALLOONS  
During North Korea Freedom week, held annually in Seoul, I was given the opportunity to 
join defectors and activists for a balloon launch. These are huge transparent plastic balloon 
tubes filled with hydrogen, at the bottom of which there are big bundles attached filled with 
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various items such as Choco pie, USBs, DVDs, transistor radios, Bibles, 1$ bills, and tens of 
thousands of counter propaganda leaflets such as the human rights declaration in Korean, and 
anti-Kim Jong-un leaflets (McCoy 2014). Why send these items to North Korea? They are all 
illegal contraband. A timer is attached to the balloons so when according to the weather 
measurements taken beforehand the activists are sure the balloons will float in the right 
direction, and blow up the bundle and distribute the items over a large area. 
I went with Inside North Korea, an NGO which follows Shin dong-hyuk. I had met 
with Inside North Korea on a meeting arranged by North Korean Freedom Week. The launch 
was held at a parking lot in Paju, close to the DMZ, and I would never have found it unless I 
was with the NGO. And that was the point. There are numerous controversies about the 
balloon launches and their effectiveness in reaching the North Korean population. Countless 
times have the North Korean government condemned the act of these “human scum”, and the 
citizens of Paju fear for their own security. Park Sang-hak, a defector, is the most well-known 
balloon launch activist, and he was present at the two launches I went to. He is the leader of 
the NGO Fighters for a Free North Korea, whose main objective is to send information from 
South Korea to North Korea. Park is on the top of the list of defectors North Korea want to 
disappear. He is “target zero” and North Korean spies had already attempted to assassinate 
him (Human Rights Foundation n.d.). We were surrounded by police, and we had undercover 
officers in our van. Present were also the People’s Liberation Front (PFL), which are military 
defectors there to protect the activists. The PFL are former officers in the North Korean army, 
clad in berets and gray-camouflage fatigues, but they would have seemed more intimidating if 
the women did not wear combat boots with high heels.  
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(Picture taken by author)  
 
WHY DO THEY DEFECT? 
 
It is not an easy decision to choose to defect. Most people either defect alone, or with one or 
more family members. Often refugees do not carry many possessions with them and do not 
have a clear idea of where they may finally settle. Most of their family they have to leave 
behind at the mercy of the North Korean security apparatus. The family will most likely be 
classified as politically disloyal having been in close contact with a “traitor”. This is because 
of “yeon-jwa-ja”, or guilt by association. Kim Il-Sung introduced the law in 1972. It is one of 
many social control tools North Korea uses on its citizens: “Kim Il-sung said, ‘it is necessary 
to root out three generations…’ If one of the family members committed the crime, they are 
all guilty, or it is presumed they will be” (Collins, 2012, 51). Family members up to three 
generations, as well as friends, neighbors or colleagues may suffer because of your defection. 
They may be tortured, purged, or sent to prison camps as punishment. It is also very 
dangerous for the individual defecting: 
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The bare statistics of defection mask the danger, hardship and suffering that North Koreans 
experience when they flee their country. Those who are captured in the act of defecting run the 
risk of arrest, torture, imprisonment, years of hard labor, and in some cases a lingering death in 
prison camps (Hassig and Oh, 2009, 224).  
 
In the latter half of the 1990s, intercity domestic travel restrictions lessened. The North 
Korean government realized that people needed to go somewhere for food, and border guards 
accepted bribes from people wanting to cross over to China (Hassig and Oh, 2009, 220). This 
was an important factor contributing to the outflow of defectors in the 1990s. Before the late 
1990s, domestic travel and travel across the border to China was almost impossible. Without a 
travel permit, which would have to be officially issued at your workplace, ordinary citizens 
did not get the chance to travel outside one’s province, or move inside the country. This travel 
permit document was modelled after the old Soviet Union identification cards (Harden, 2012, 
150). Travelers going to Pyongyang, border areas or other restricted areas would need an 
additional permit (Harden, 2012, 150; Hassig and Oh, 2009, 226).  
The majority of defectors come from the three northernmost provinces of North 
Korea, North Hamgyong, South Hamgyong and Ryanggang. This means low songbun status, 
poverty, easier accessibility to border areas, and their natural environment (Harden, 2012, 
152). Farming is difficult in these mountainous areas, so crossing the Sino-Korean border to 
China has been used by merchants and traders going back between China and North Korea. 
“… by 2000, traders had begun to move back and forth across the border in their thousands, 
supplying food and goods for markets that had all but replaced the governments public 
distribution system” (Harden, 2012, 162-163).  
Park, one of the young defectors who is currently attending a university in Seoul, 
explained how he thinks most defectors feel about defection. From his perspective he thinks 
that they follow the Maslow pyramid22. Because basic needs such as food, water and sleep, 
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 The psychologist Abraham Maslow described the people's needs as a pyramid where 
the most basic needs come first. Using this pyramid, he showed how the needs govern human 
development and motivation. The various steps build on each other, so one must have covered 
the bottom step before one can "climb" up the pyramid. Maslow believed that the needs built 
on each other and that could only be move up the pyramid when the needs at the level below 
was covered. Today, most people agree that this is not absolute. We can meet several needs 
simultaneously, and we may find that the need for recognition is satisfied even if we for 
example are hungry (Maslow 2014). 
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were not fulfilled in North Korea, many went over to China to meet their needs. “These are 
instinctive needs” Park explained. Many border-crossers leave for China to return back to 
North Korea, and some do it as a job, becoming a professional border-crosser bringing in 
food, money, goods and information. Many defectors escape to China without the intention to 
go further. But as they are considered illegal migrants in China, and therefore the risk of being 
repatriated back to North Korea is high, their need for security heightens. Subsequently, 
defectors decide that they would make the risky escape to South Korea or other asylum 
friendly countries.  
 
 
ESCAPING NORTH KOREA  
 
There are three main ways to escape North Korea. One is by sea to either China, Japan or 
South Korea, another is through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to South Korea and lastly, 
crossing either the Tumen or Yalu (Amnok) rivers to China. 
Escaping by sea is dangerous, and there are only a few who have made it (Choson Ilbo 
2011). To escape successfully by sea would involve more than one person, because an 
individual could not navigate the distances it takes to get to safety. One would need a larger 
boat, and a good sailor to maneuver the boat away from North Korean navy patrol boats. The 
journey by sea is to either navigate down the coastline directly to South Korea, or “across the 
West Sea to reach China two hundred miles to the west (but much closer if the boat just 
crosses the North Korea-China border), or sailing across the East Sea some five to six 
hundred miles to Japan” (Hassig and Oh, 2009, 225).  
The second route is trying to make one’s way through the minefield of the four-
kilometer-wide DMZ separating North and South Korea. People who have managed to get 
through the DMZ to South Korea successfully have been North Korean border guards who 
know their way in the DMZ area. The last route, the most common and easiest way of 
defecting North Korea is to cross either the Tumen or Yalu (Amnok) Rivers into Jilin or 
Liaoning provinces in China, or Russia23.  It is the safest of them all, but it leaves the person a 
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 Going to Russia is rarely attempted because it leaves the refugees even farther from 
their destination. Blending in with the local population is also more difficult than it is in 
China. 
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long way from South Korea. The Yalu River that separates China and North Korea's western 
borders is deep and wide, making it more difficult to cross without a boat (Hassig and Oh, 
2009, 226). The Tumen River, which is shallow and narrow, forms about a third of the eastern 
border with China and the short border with Russia (Harden, 2012, 160).  
Because of the porous border between North Korea and China with only the Tumen 
River separating the two countries it has become the primary defect route for defectors. The 
Tumen usually freezes during the winter making it easier for defectors to escape by just 
running over the few meters it takes to cross (Hassig and Oh, 2009, 226). Although it may not 
be deep, during the summer it has powerful currents which can be difficult to wade through. 
On the Chinese side of the river there are dense trees and bushes working as cover for the 
defectors that they can hide in. Although the border areas are filled with North Korean border 
guards they can be eluded or bribed.  Border security in North Korea became stricter around 
2004. North Korea enforced higher punishments for illegal border crossers, with prison terms 
of up to five years (Harden, 2012, 164). Electronic, motion and photographic surveillance 
systems were installed along the border. China also increased border security in the run up to 
their 2008 Summer Olympics (Harden, 2012, 165). They wanted to discourage North Koreans 
from entering the country. This scared the many people who had made their living by trading. 
Also, after the succession of Kim Jong-un, the security was again reinforced and the numbers 
of defectors arriving in South Korea dropped (Ministry of Unification, n.d. a).  
 
 
THE “JOSEONJOK” PEOPLE 
 
When crossing into China, the first people defectors meet are usually ethnic Koreans. Dana 
remembers that as a child she could hear Chinese children yelling from the other side of the 
river, taunting her, asking if she was hungry. The three northernmost provinces of Northern 
China consist of “Joseonjok” people, numbering up to 2 million people (Harden, 2012, 171; 
Freeman, 2005, 80). They speak Korean, eat similar food and share many cultural similarities. 
Since the late 1800s, ethnic Koreans from Korea (at that time the peninsula was not divided) 
fled across the Tumen and Yalu Rivers into northeast China. China welcomed them and used 
them as a buffer against Russian expansion (Harden, 2012, 171). Because of these ethnic 
Koreans, North Korean defectors can blend in easier when they defect over to China. But, 
since the number of defectors fleeing North Korea has been growing, the local people are not 
as friendly as they used to be. Many have turned desperate defectors into a business 
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trafficking North Korean women to lonely Chinese men, and North Korean men to businesses 
that need cheap labor (Bloomberg 2015).  
As shown in the statistics in the introduction of this thesis, 70 percent of defectors are 
women (Ministry of Unification, n.d. a). These are under risk of being trafficked and abused 
during their flight from the North. None of my informants had personally been taken 
advantage of, but their mothers with whom they defected with were. The mother of Victoria 
was sold to a poor Chinese man. He was a single farmer and wanted a son from the middle-
aged mother. They worked at his farm for several years as virtual slaves before the mother 
managed to get pregnant and give him a son. Now Victoria has a half-brother in China whom 
she has not seen in many years. Dana's mother was raped because a Chinese broker did not 
get enough money to transport them to the border between Mongolia and China. He initially 
wanted the underage Dana, but her mother offered herself for her daughter's sake.  
 
 
IN CHINA  
 
Due to The People's Republic of China being a close ally to North Korea, fleeing to a third 
country is the best option for defectors. China refuses to grant North Korean defectors refugee 
status and consider them illegal economic migrants. If defectors are caught in China, they are 
repatriated back to North Korea to face harsh punishments, or even death (Human Rights 
Watch n.d.; Hassig and Oh, 2009, 227). Although they can blend in easily with the local 
population in China, living in China without being caught is harder. Despite China’s 
obligations to the 1951 and 1967 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, they forcibly 
repatriate North Korean defectors (UNHCR n.d.). The best way for defectors to hide from the 
police is to go to one of the many NGOs or South Korean religious organizations operating in 
the border areas between China and North Korea. The real challenge for defectors is to get out 
of China and into South Korea or another country that will treat them as legitimate refugees. 
No one knows for certain the number of North Korean defectors living illegally in China. But 
NGOs and human rights groups estimate that it can be from about 30,000 to 100,000 or even 
more (Hassig and Oh, 2009, 218).  
If caught in China defectors face interrogations once repatriated back in North Korea. 
These interrogations are often accompanied by beatings and torture. The interrogator wants to 
know if you have been in contact with South Koreans or any religious organizations (Hassig 
and Oh, 2009, 231). They also want to know if you have watched South Korean TV, movies 
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or listened to South Korean radio. Hassig and Oh (20009) explains that the North Korean 
police wants answers to certain questions to determine the punishment. If you are found guilty 
in wanting to defect to South Korea you will face longer sentences than if you just went to 
China to trade and earn money. Women are also asked if they had any sexual relations with 
Chinese men. Those defectors, who can answer no to all of these questions, would be 
sentenced to a few months to a year in a labor camp as punishment. Any yes answer will earn 
the defector a sentence in a political prison camp for more than one year, on the charges of 
being a spy or a traitor (Hassig and Oh, 2009, 231). Once they are sentenced as a defector it 
will be on their personal record, and also affecting their songbun status. They will be branded 
as politically disloyal, and must endure closer surveillance than ordinary citizens.  
 
Although to learn about the escape and the lives of my informants in North Korea were not 
my main objective during my fieldwork, it was certainly a crucial part of my informants’ past. 
They told me how they defected rather soon after meeting me. Sulli shocked me by telling me 
on our first meeting, while others waited to our second or third meeting.  
Sulli told me her defection story while we were walking from her apartment to the 
subway station. It was our first meeting, and during my visit to her apartment for two hours 
we had just talked small talk about ourselves, and planned for the next time we were meeting. 
While we were walking to the subway station it was already nighttime and dark. We walked 
through a tunnel and she excitedly asked me if I wanted to know how she defected from 
North Korea. Taken aback, I let her tell her story. We spoke in English and there was an echo 
in the tunnel. She told me that she ran across the Tumen River at nighttime, during winter. 
The river was mostly frozen. She had paid off the border guards with money. What really 
shocked me was when she said that “Jenny”, her then 4-5 year old daughter, was on her back. 
She was afraid that some other guard, not the one bribed, would see them and shoot her in the 
back. She said her heart kept beating so hard, that she thought others could hear it. Later when 
I met other defectors their story was very similar to Sulli’s. They had all gone across the 
Tumen River, during winter at night. Some had done it several times. Some had been 
repatriated back to North Korea. Park had a broker on the Chinese side waiting for him to 
assist him in his defection all the way to South Korea. Others went to China with no help, and 
found brokers there.  
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ESCAPING TO SOUTH KOREA  
 
There are four escape routes to South Korea for North Korean defectors. The main objective 
for defectors when they decide, in China, that they want to go further, is to get to South Korea 
where the government grants them automatic citizenship.  
The cheapest way is to run inside a South Korean or any foreign consulate or embassy 
in China. The United Nations office has also been used by defectors as a safe house. This 
became very popular in the early 2000s (Hassig and Oh, 2009). Although there are many 
military and security personnel outside the consulates and embassies, if defectors go as a big 
group the police cannot catch them all. This escape route was shown in the movie “Crossing” 
(2008), and was how Shin Dong Hyuk got into safety (Harden, 2012).  
The most expensive way is to get a forged passport and fly from an airport in China to 
Seoul. The costs are from $10,000 for these services (Hassig and Oh, 2009, 228-229). This is 
how my informant Park travelled to Seoul. He explained that his father was a high ranking 
military officer in North Korea and therefore had important information to give to the South 
Korean government. For this his father got paid a lot of money which he used to get his son to 
South Korea. Park was picked up at his grandparents’ house in North Korea, helped across the 
Tumen River and led all the way to the airport gate by different brokers. He was even shocked 
by how the passport controller at the Beijing airport was in on the operation. “Money talks” he 
said. Not many defectors can afford to get a fake passport and identity papers. It is the 
quickest escape, and a “first-class” escape from start to finish could take as little as three 
weeks (Harden, 2012, 145).  
The most dangerous route is going through the Gobi desert in Mongolia to the South 
Korean embassy in Ulan Bator, the capital of Mongolia. Mongolia does not repatriate 
defectors. From the Chinese border they walk following the railway tracks at a far distance. 
However, reaching Mongolia is difficult as there are only open plains of unforgiving desert, 
making navigation at night difficult. It is easy to get lost in the vast desert, and some never 
make it (Hassig and Oh, 2009, 229). Sulli said she did not know whether she saw walking in 
the correct direction, in circles or back to China. Seeing the police and guards in Mongolia the 
defectors are so happy to be taken to the police station. All of my informants chose this route 
except Park, as mentioned above. The price for this escape is around $2,000 and up.  
Victoria told me about a girl she met during the escape to Mongolia through the Gobi 
desert who really upset her. This girl had defected alone from North Korea and therefore had 
no one to help her. At the age of 18 she had been sold three times and she had two children. 
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Victoria said to me that even though she had a tough time in China, there were other stories 
that were far worse than hers.  
The longest, but safer route is through Southeast Asia down to Thailand. They usually 
go through Laos, but Myanmar, Cambodia and Vietnam have also been used as transit 
countries. Thailand however is the only country that will send defectors to South Korea, not 
North Korea. Arriving in Thailand would require travelling many miles along an underground 
transportation network consisting of railways, buses, automobiles, treacherous river crossings 
and arduous travel on foot (Harden, 2012, 145; Hassig and Oh, 2009, 229). In Thailand the 
defectors will stay in a Thai prison for about one month before they are flown to Seoul. This 
route was the one “Halmoni”, Sulli’s mother, used to arrive in South Korea. Sulli paid for 
Halmoni to take the safest route since she is approaching 80 years old.  
 
 
ARRIVING IN SOUTH KOREA  
 
The South Korean government recognizes North Korean refugees as “dislocated people” 
(Ministry of Unification n.d. a). When a defector requests protection and transfer to South 
Korea, the MoU, will take the appropriate measures so that the refugees are transferred to 
South Korea (Ministry of Unification n.d. d). In the meantime refugees will be accommodated 
in foreign diplomatic offices or temporary shelters in the host country. South Korea’s Ministry 
of Unification was established in 1969 as a government organization in charge of all issues 
pertaining to Inter-Korean relations and is making preparations for a future unification 
between North and South Korea (Ministry of Unification n.d. c). It is responsible for 
managing North Korean defectors in South Korea, manage resettlement policies and educate 
both defectors and the general public about inter-Korean problems: “The existence of 
Ministry of Unification reflects the unique reality of the Korean peninsula, which still remains 
divided since the end of the Korean War” (Ministry of Unification n.d c). 
Upon entrance in South Korea, interrogation by the National Intelligence Service 
(NIS) and other government agencies will take place. All North Korean defectors arriving in 
South Korea have to go through one month (or more) of interrogation, for security reasons. 
Here the NIS will weed out potential North Korean spies or ethnic Korean Chinese. Defectors 
will here be given medical examination and access to free health care. After interrogation, 
they will be transferred to the “Settlement Support Center for North Korean Refugees”, the 
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governmental educational facility of Hanawon to “undergo basic social orientation to become 
South Korean citizens” (Ministry of Unification n.d. d). 
Hanawon was established in Anseong, Gyeonggi Province in 1999. In December 2012 
a second Hanawon opened in Hwacheon-gun, Gangwon Province because of the increase in 
defectors arriving each year. The training at Hanawon is about twelve weeks, around 392 
hours of classes. At Hanawon defectors receive education for social adaptation in four areas to 
help them adjust to South Korean society: «physical health and psychological stability; 
understanding South Korean society; initial settlement support; and career counselling and 
vocational training» (ICG 2011, 22). At Hanawon defectors learn about the peninsula's history 
(that the North started the Korean War), democracy and human rights. The orientation is 
intended to give defectors basic knowledge necessary to function in South Korean society 
such as using the subway, an ATM, use credit cards and read the Roman alphabet. The main 
objective is to get defectors to regain emotional stability and motivate them to become 
socially and economically independent (Ministry of Unification n.d. d). During their stay at 
Hanawon they are taken on field trips where they learn how to buy clothes, order drinks and 
food at cafes, and visit the grocery stores. These field trips are the only times defectors are 
allowed outside of Hanawon. During their stay they are under heavy travel restrictions, and 
security is tight with barbed wire, security guards and cameras. This is because of the security 
concerns that surround defectors. The threat of kidnapping and assassination is real. Some 
higher ranking defectors have South Korean police agents present at all times, even when they 
are let back into South Korean society.  
 
In 2012, Hanawon started to focus their efforts in instilling a work ethic and the desire to 
work in defectors. They provide gender-specific job training for defectors. Hanawon also 
offers educational programs for refugee children. They try to help them catch up to education 
they have missed while in North Korea or in transit countries. The students are placed in 
classes according to their age and academic level. MoU writes on its webpage that “It 
specifically emphasizes education in South Korean language and vocational training, which 
are especially useful for quick settlement” (Ministry of Unification n.d. d). 
Although the training at Hanawon is useful for adapting to South Korean life, it is 
limited. Defectors are expected to master an almost entirely different culture in three months, 
while recovering from the traumas they experienced in North Korea and on their journey to 
South Korea. After they complete the training from Hanawon, defectors are granted certain 
benefits including healthcare, financial subsidies for settlement, job training, employment 
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incentive and subsidy. Refugees are transferred to their residences after registration of family 
relation and arrangement for housing is cleared. After this is complete, North Korean 
defectors obtain residence registration number and legal status as citizens of South Korea 
(Sohn, 2013, 113). MoU also helps in educational support, such as special admission and 
transfer to schools and support tuition (Ministry of Unification n.d. d).  
After their stay at Hanawon is complete refugees receive “Residence support” for five 
years. Because of the sums it costs to defect completely to South Korea, many defectors were 
in debt to their brokers as soon as they arrived in Seoul. But by 2008, the South Korean 
government changed the way it distributed its cash support for defectors to keep brokers from 
taking all their money. Instead of offering a lump-sum, money is paid over time. Money also 
goes directly to housing, eliminating any chance for it to be taken by a broker (Harden, 2012, 
146). Defectors will receive housing in an area of their choice, but it may sometimes be 
determined by lottery as well, depending on the availability in that area. The MoU organizes 
the regional adaptation centers called Hana Centers, which help defectors in their daily life, 
after graduation from Hanawon. There are 32 Hana Centers nationwide, and their task is to 
provide information on everyday life, psychological and career counseling services, and 
education to help refugees adapt to their community (Ministry of Unification n.d d). In 2014, 
the delivery system was improved in such a way that each Hana Center will offer one-stop 
support services for all purposes including employment, education, and welfare. 
However, when defectors finish their stay at Hanawon, several problems arise. As 
most of my informants told me, they were not interested in learning about history and 
computers at that time, and they did not wrap their minds around the fact that it would be so 
important when outside. Dana told me “After staying hidden in China for many months that 
turned into years, and then staying in the Mongolian prison for three months. Being told that 
we were going to Hanawon to receive education for three more months felt like another prison 
to me. I just wanted to go outside and meet people.” When they are let outside many become 
bewildered and overwhelmed by feelings of being ostracized and alienated. Differences in 
cultural norms and values make everyday life hard. In chapter four I will be discussing this 
more deeply as we discuss identity problems, stigma and networking among North Korean 
defectors.  
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SONGBUN FOLLOWS DEFECTORS 
I will highlight the life stories of Sulli and Krystal, two North Korean women who are about 
the same age. The difference between them is how their lives were in North Korea. Their 
previous life in North Korea and the privileges or lack of privileges in some ways followed 
them to South Korea.  
Sulli, is a woman from the city Musan, North Hamgyong province in North Korea. 
She was classified in the hostile class, as most of the people living in the northern parts of 
North Korea. Her father was a miner and her mother a housewife. After Sulli graduated high 
school she did not have a good enough songbun status to go to university, and therefore 
worked as a telephone operator.  Because of her low status and therefore low education she 
did not have many choices in life to move up the social ladder. She married someone in her 
songbun class, and they got a daughter together. Their daughter, Jenny, would have the same 
limitations as Sulli had because of her husband’s songbun. Sulli quit her job when she found 
out she was pregnant. After her husband died in an mining accident, she decided to defect. 
North Korea operated on a distribution system and had rations. Without her husband it would 
be difficult getting an adequate ration. Because of hunger she decided to go over the Tumen 
River with Jenny on her back, to China. With the help of a broker Sulli and Jenny did not stay 
in China for long, nor were they taken advantage of the way many North Korean women are. 
They went to the Gobi desert in Mongolia and got caught by Mongolian border police and 
sent to South Korea after a few months there. After arriving in South Korea and going through 
investigation and Hanawon she was finally a South Korean citizen.  
The day I met her she had just graduated from nursing school from a good university 
in South Korea. It had now been eight years since she arrived in South Korea. She told me 
how she was ostracized in university by other students because she was from the North. She 
called herself a penguin which were left out in in the cold, outside of the ring that keeps all 
the other penguins warm. She said she tried to hide the fact that she is from the North, but was 
revealed by the other students. Sulli had a hard time at university and she told me studying did 
not come natural for her, and especially not studying for eight hours or more each day. While I 
was doing my fieldwork Sulli were going to many interviews, and she told me how they 
reacted negatively to her being from the North. Even with a university degree in nursing, she 
did not have a full time job when I left South Korea after my fieldwork was done. When I 
arrived back in August 2015, I went to visit Sulli and her family to see how they were doing. 
Sulli now works full time at a hospital close to her house.  
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Krystal however had a different life story than Sulli. Krystal grew up in Pyongyang 
which only the core class is allowed to. Her father was a member of the Korean Workers 
Party, meaning they were well off. She went to one of the best universities in North Korea and 
graduated with a bachelor degree in economics. Her family was kicked out of Pyongyang, for 
reasons she did not tell me. Experiencing this decline in social mobility she decided to escape 
North Korea to South Korea looking for freedom. When she arrived she applied for work in 
the same industry that she had been working in while in the North. However her education 
was not transferable and up to par with South Korean standards. She got a job in the service 
industry, far from what she had previously done. The pay were less than 10,000 KRW an hour 
and the days were 10-12 hours long. This really hit her hard because she was from the upper 
class, the elite, and now she had hit, for her, rock bottom. This was not what she expected 
when she left North Korea. Later she was employed by a bigger company and worked at the 
front desk. The problems that occurred were that this company had a lot of business with 
foreigners and foreign brand names. Customers would talk to her but she did not understand 
the names, and was let go after a few months. This became a turning point in her life and she 
decided to start on scratch and go back to university. She used the competence that she had 
acquired at university in North Korea, such as reading and studying skills, and she graduated 
with a master's degree from a good South Korean university. Now she is working for North 
Korean defectors rights in Seoul. 
How life unfolded in North Korea, in the collectivized society, based on songbun 
status, has ramifications for those who end up leaving the North. As for Sulli she tries to move 
up the social ladder, and to rid herself of the social status she had previously in North Korea. 
Krystal came from a privileged family living in Pyongyang, but was moved to the 
countryside. When she arrived in South Korea she thought that she again would be a part of 
the middle or high-class, but were confronted with her expectations. She was forced to 
reconsider her skills, and built her way up again, to what can be considered a very good life 
even after South Korean standards.  
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Chapter IV 
Modernity, identity and stigma 
 
 
This chapter is about how North Koreans are portrayed in South Korean society. The first 
section of this chapter addresses the subject of modernity and individualization. From the 
topic of individualization I move to the subject of who is considered Korean in South Korea 
and how this matters to defectors and their identities. Nationalism, ethnicity, belonging and 
identity will be touched upon in that segment of the chapter. I also bring up the subject of 
stigma. With the North Korean defector population approaching 30,000 they still are a 
minority group in South Korea, facing increasing discrimination.  
 
 
INCREASINGLY FACING DISCRIMINATION 
 
Joanna Hosaniak in “Homecoming Kinsmen or Indigenous Foreigners” (2011) explains that 
despite North Koreans being ethnic Korean, they face the same problems and challenges as a 
non-Korean immigrant would face in South Korea. Similarities but at the same time 
differences in language, culture and norms create difficulties assimilating. North Korea, 
although technically the same “nation” as the South is perceived by both North and South 
Koreans as different. This is revealed in the difficulties faced by North Koreans re-settling in 
other countries, particularly South Korea, and the attitudes towards return migration amongst 
many refugees (Hosaniak 2011). Being refugees they had to leave their homes and their roots, 
but what is different is that their host country is a place with similar culture and language. 
This could have been an advantage, but becomes a disadvantage in that their host country, 
South Korea, feels like defectors should adapt quicker and better than other immigrants. 
North Koreans are viewed as most likely to adapt to the South Korean society based on shared 
ethnicity and common language (Hosaniak 2011). This social expectation that defectors will 
adapt and integrate faster does not take into consideration their hardships before coming to 
and the confusion they experience when arriving in South Korea. 
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“In this sense, being a burden on society, and lacking even some form of birth right, places 
North Korean refugees in an extremely ambiguous position: they are not quite foreigners, in 
that they are classified as Koreans, members of the same ethnic group as South Koreans; yet 
neither are they quite South Korean nationals, in that they behave unconventionally, fail to 
adapt to South Korean norms, and long remain dependent on the contributions of South 
Koreans. Their existence runs counter to the prevailing neo-liberal ethic in South Korea, 
because they do not contribute toward society’s wealth on the one hand and are unable to 
assume responsibility for their own well-being on the other. Not only do they fail to obtain and 
hold jobs, but many do not stay in school, complete high school or college courses, become 
rich or successful, and become proper South Koreans by participating in a competitive social 
environment.”(Ryang, 2012, 7) 
 
 
MODERNITY AND INDIVIDUALIZATION 
 
After completing Hanawon, Harry, one of the younger defectors I got to meet, was enrolled in 
a South Korean high school. He went to a store to buy school supplies such as stationery and 
pens. He said that in front of him there were hundreds of pens in different colors, prints and 
patterns, and with different colored ink. He was so overwhelmed by the choices that he was 
unable to choose a pen that day. He told me that in North Korea there was the option of one 
single pen only, and therefore it was easy. “You could not question your choice, if it was the 
right one or not, because you only had one option”, Harry said. As creativity can be seen as a 
threat to the Kim regime, people try to follow the rules instead of questioning their validity. 
Conversely, almost everything you do is open for reconsideration in South Korea. What may 
seem like a trivial thing, not being able to choose a pen, is the reality that some defectors face 
arriving in South Korea. The life trajectory of the individual was largely predetermined in 
North Korea while in South Korea it must be created. Coming from a place where one is told 
what to do and how to do it, and suddenly arriving at a place where the choices are endless 
can be very confusing: 
 
Everyone is constantly being forced to consider how to live his or her life. There are no more 
predetermined answers to that question: ‘Today’s individual feel steamrolled, smothered by 
options which, although they are not actual choices, none the less demand that decisions be 
made as fast as possible, in an almost reflex-like manner, so to say… the individual… in this 
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way is no longer able to construct linear, narrative biographies.’ (Beck, 2007a: 583: our 
translation quoted in Sørensen and Christiansen, 2012, 47) 
 
Modernity theorists such as sociologists Ulrich Beck (1992) and Anthony Giddens 
(1991) both focus on the impact modernity has on social life. Both Beck and Giddens look at 
the consequences of the changes Western societies are going through at the socio-political 
level and how the modern industrial societies are transforming. And because of this historical 
development people's condition of life, trajectory and experiences are changing. The new 
society, the new modernity, can be described with words like globalization, individualization, 
reflexivity, new forms of risk, doubt, choice and freedom. All these new changes represent 
new premises for identity and socialization. It is important to specify that globalization is 
central in the understanding of modernity. After World War II there has been an acceleration 
of commodities, ideas, and people on a global scale across national borders. A common 
ground among Beck and Giddens is that they both focus on the freedom to choose who a 
person wants to be, and how a person wants others to perceive him or her. Much 
responsibility is placed on the individual to make their own choices - and the freedom of 
choice is too big for some. 
The core in Ulrich Beck’s theory is that modernity is characterized by risk (1992). He 
focuses on the “radicalization of the individual”, and how the generally collective such as 
family, education, gender roles and social classes are losing their function and meaning. There 
are fewer normative rules to follow, and the goal is not fixed. Accordingly, focus shifts to the 
individual and his or her individual realization of a life of their own. Individualization means 
increased freedom, but it also means an increased possibility for failure, more uncertainty and 
unpredictability. In what Beck calls “first modern societies” (Beck 1992 in Sørensen and 
Christiansen, 2012, 29) the individual is controlled. Here the collective puts limits on the 
individual, whose life trajectory and social status are (largely) predetermined. North Korea 
can be seen as a “first modern society” as it monitors the information that goes in and out of 
the country, controls the individual, and determines their social status. Moving to South 
Korea, the safety the North Korean system previously provided in the form of free school, 
kindergarten, residence and a secure job are suddenly gone, and responsibility is entrusted to 
the individual. For many informants changes involved a movement from order to chaos, from 
forced everyday life to freedom, and from security to insecurity. As society evolved to a 
“second modernity” the collective restraints loosened, while the welfare state blossomed. The 
individual was given the freedom to choose to live a life of their own. South Korea can be 
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considered a “second modern society”. Here, life is mostly up to the individual to choose, 
with guidance from parents, friends and others: 
 
Most of the conditions and affairs that come together to form the life of an individual today 
demand of each individual that he or she be involved in an active and ongoing process of 
decision-making. This is the case for every life decision, from the most trivial everyday thing 
to the large, existential questions of life (Sørensen and Christiansen, 2012, 40). 
 
Park said coming to South Korea was: “like arriving in the modern world in a time machine.” 
He told me that he was very confused. He now had a South Korean citizenship, but he was 
born in North Korea. He considered himself North Korean, but on paper he was South 
Korean. He said that for three years after his arrival he could not answer any question about 
identity. “Who am I?” was a question he frequently asked himself. Classmates would ask him 
which country was better, South Korea or North Korea. He felt very ambivalent because “of 
course South Korea was better”, but he had many good memories from the North as it was 
where he was born and had grown up. He also had some bad memories of both North and 
South Korea. He experienced difficulties in South Korea regarding discrimination. After those 
three years of confusion he came to the conclusion that he is just Korean, a person of the 
whole Korean peninsula, a person that does not differentiate between the North and the 
South:“Whether Hanguk (South Korea) or Choson (North Korea) they are all the same 
minjok (nation)
24
.”  
While Park’s experiences and predicaments were clearly and genuinely his own, they 
resonate well with Anthony Giddens’s observations on life in “late” or “high modern” 
societies (1991). Giddens is mostly known for his theory on reflexivity. According to him 
people have a whole range of choices before them, not only about lifestyle and appearance, 
but also in relationships, where the individuals now have to make choices on their own. “The 
question ‘What do you want to be?’ used to have to do merely with education and trade; 
today, it covers every aspect of our human existence; religion, identity, marriage, parenthood” 
(Sørensen and Christiansen, 2012, 47). The formation of identity is according to Giddens a 
reflexive project. As a result, modern individuals have to be constantly “self-reflexive,” 
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 “Minjok” can also be translated to “people”, “race” or “ethnicity”. 
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thinking about what they should do and who they should be. He focuses on how modernity 
can be dynamical. Giddens: “recognizes that this new freedom places new burdens and 
responsibilities on people; particularly in a world of increasing risk and insecurity, the 
individual is placed under greater emotional stress” (Buckingham, 2008, 9). 
 
But the process of adaptation is also a creative one, of establishing a new culture and new 
identities, of exploration and experimentation. In the process of losing country, community, 
family, status, property, culture, and even a sense of personal identity, replacements for these 
losses must be created for refugees’ lives to continue, as well as for adjustment to the new and 
changing circumstances of their lives in the places they now find themselves (Camino and 
Krulfeld, 1994, x). 
 
Everyone in a special way has to reflect on themselves - who they are. Identity is something 
that needs to be maintained and produced continuously and is an ongoing process. When 
someone looks in the mirror, he or she knows that this person must actively be created daily. 
This person has to take a stand on different ways to be “someone”. It becomes important to 
create an identity that you wish to communicate to the outside world. The modern world 
places this responsibility on each individual.  
 
IMAGINED COMMUNITY AND NATION BUILDING 
 
Most societies are based on a common or shared identity. To use Benedict Anderson's (1991) 
well known phrase, communities are “imagined”. An "imagined community" according to 
Anderson is an imaginary belonging to a community. The term was introduced in terms of 
nationalism and nation states. A national community is "imagined" because the members of 
even the smallest nation will never meet or get to know all the members of a nation, yet have 
a notion of a community with these people, they are bound together by “abstractions rather 
than physical connections” (Lim, 2009, 1). A nation is defined in the sense that there are 
absolute limits that distinguish one nation from other nations. A nation exists and defines 
itself largely on the basis of its borders, and in opposition to other nations. One needs other 
nations to feel as a nation (Anderson, 1991). The nation is perceived as an equal brotherhood, 
regardless of socio-economic differences that may exist in a country (Anderson, 1991, 6). As 
a constructivist, Anderson argues that nations and nationalism are products of modernity. The 
state uses nationalism as a tool to organize the thousands of people living in it to fight, even 
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die for the state. Nation, nationalism, ethnicity and identity are not static, but constantly 
changing. But for Koreans this concept of a nation as something that is constructed is 
unfamiliar. Koreans believe that Korea is something fixed and eternal, and something that has 
been since the beginning of time (Won, 2010, 96). 
Nation building is a process in which national identity is formed in a group of people 
through the state. Nation building is most common after major structural changes such as the 
dissolution of states or when a colonial power pulls out of a country (Hylland Eriksen 1996). 
It is not only the society or the economy that needs to be rebuilt, but also the national identity 
of the people. In nation building common history, ethnicity, language, past and future is 
emphasized as cultural characteristics. The state will use metaphors like the nation is a family, 
and transfer the feelings and loyalty one has towards family to apply to the nation. In many 
nations and in South Korea as well, kinship terms like mother tongue, fatherland and that we 
are all “brothers and sisters” is used to strengthen the “imagined community”, the ethnic 
group or the nation (Hylland Eriksen 1996).  
During competitions, and especially international sports events such as The World Cup 
and the Olympics, nationalistic feelings are promoted. The events can be seen as “battles”, 
country against country. The performers are not participants on their own behalf, but on 
behalf of a nation. During the time I was in Seoul in 2014 the Winter Olympics were held in 
Sochi, Russia. South Korea participated in many competitions and won three gold, three silver 
and two bronze medals. After our second meeting, the same night as the event of the kimchi 
cabbage head, as I am on my way out, Sulli said to me to watch TV that night. Especially at 
2AM as it was then figure skater Kim Yuna, South Koreas “Queen Yuna”, would compete for 
the gold. Although Sulli was going to her first job interview as a qualified nurse the next 
morning, she was going to stay up from 2AM to 4AM to watch Kim Yuna figure skate. She 
felt that rooting for South Korea was important. Coming from Norway, a country that usually 
does very well at the Olympics, I wanted to watch the Olympics and cheer on my nation. But 
to my surprise South Korean television, at least the channels I had access to, did not show any 
events unless South Korea was competing. Although the majority of the inhabitants of every 
nation probably becomes more nationalistic during competitions against other countries, it 
was very interesting to see that there was no opportunity to watch countries other than South 
Korea perform. 
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NATION BUILDING IN SOUTH KOREA 
 
The problem of identity and South Korean “Koreanness” is a reflection of a history of being 
subordinate to powerful foreign states and the tragedy of national division after World War II 
(Savada and Shaw 1990a). Carter Eckert notes that there was little collective feeling toward 
the abstract concept of “Korea” as a nation before the 20th century (Eckert, 1990, 226). The 
shaping of Korean nationalism has largely been credited to historian and journalist Shin Chae-
ho (1880-1936). Shin focused on the idea of the Korean nation as an ethnic identity, 
emphasizing the ancientness of the Korean nation and the narration of the founding myth of 
Dangun (Won, 2010, 96).  
Shin’s interpretation of Korean history greatly influenced Koreans’ view of their nation. 
Adopting Shin’s ethnicist or primordialist view, many Koreans regard the idea of the Korean 
ethnic unity as natural, since all Koreans are considered descendants of Dangun. According to 
those who hold this view, the Korean nation has been a “unitary nation of common blood, 
territory, language, culture, and historical destiny for thousands of years” (Won, 2010, 96-97).  
The process of nation building in Korea began when Japan colonized Korea. Japan attempted 
to assimilate Koreans into Japanese society by using a variety of different strategies. A few 
examples were that Japanese language was introduced at all schools, banning the Korean 
language as a consequence. Japan also enforced Japanese names. Japan and South Korea are 
also in a dispute over the territorial sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks, known as Dok-do 
in South Korea and Takeshima in Japan25. But these are minor issues compared to the use of 
Korean women as sex slaves, “comfort women”, during World War II. Japan never officially 
apologized, and this is a huge diplomatic issue to this day (Lim, 2009, 12; Panda 2015). 
Nationalism was used as a motivation for the Korean nation to resist Japanese assimilation 
and to hope to be an independent nation soon. Japan is often used as an opposing state, often 
given the role of “other” and evil: 
National and ethnic groups often need an “other”, a group of outsiders against whom they can 
define themselves. While Western countries with their individualistic and, from a Confucian 
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 As a visitor to the South Korean War Memorial Museum, the first thing you see 
when you enter is a big TV screen showing “Dok-do” island, where cameras 24/7 follow the 
situation on the island. 
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perspective, self-centered ways of life provide important images of “otherness” for South 
Koreans, the principal source of such images for many years has been Japan (Savada and 
Shaw 1990a). 
 
The Korean notion of Japan as other is based on ill feelings for Japan when Korea were under 
Japanese rule, and how brutally the Japanese used the Korean population. When Korea 
regained independence from the Japanese after World War II “the sense of ethnic nationalism 
and unity was at its highest point” (Won, 2010, 97). After the division of Korea into two 
separate hostile states, again a process of nation building started. A building of “Koreanness”, 
and efforts at determining what it means to be Korean took place. Dennis Hart notes that there 
was a process from the late 1940s to the mid-1970s where the southern government featured 
North Korea as the national “other” (Hart, 2000, 142). At the time North Korea were having 
economic success and boasted of socialism and self-reliance. In contrast, the South were 
having problems with political unrest, autocratic military governments and the South were 
dependent on foreign aid both politically and economically (Hart, 2000, 142). It is interesting 
that both South and North Korea continued to proclaim a pure bloodline and ethnic 
homogeneity, but with respect to other political aspects they differed greatly. 
These early contrasts prompted the southern regime to treat the north as their national Other so 
as to increase popular acceptance of the southern regime and delegitimize the claims from the 
north. The northern government has chosen a national Other that emphasizes non-Koreans and 
voices a need to excise the demons of foreign influences (Hart, 2000, 142). 
South Korean nationalism was very much built during authoritarian military leader Park 
Chung-hee (in office from 1961 to 1979), the current president Park Geun-hye’s father. He 
proposed the “construction first, unification later” theory (Won, 2010, 98). The motto of the 
times became anti-communism, along with nationalism with an emphasis on “racial purity” 
(Kim Hyung-a 2004). It was during Park Chung-hee’s that South Korea went from rags to 
riches in a very short time. 
 
“KOREANNESS” 
 
Since Korea was divided, both countries have used propaganda to undermine the opposing 
state. Before the turn of the millennium, North Koreans were portrayed as: “almost inevitably 
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monochromatic, treating counterparts across the 38th Parallel as virulently evil Communists 
or downtrodden, brainwashed automatons” (Green and Epstein, 2013, 1). The South Korean 
society portrays defectors as outsiders: “This society has a way of saying, ‘you are different, 
and therefore you are the problem,’ ” said Kim [a defector]” (Sunwoo 2013). North Korean 
defectors are considered another type of Korean, and are therefore “other”: 
 
In the absence of concrete ethnic differences between North and South, two postwar states of 
North and South produced state-based nationhood, a pseudo-ethnicity, in which North Korean 
settlers in contemporary South Korea are regarded as a distinct ethnic-like group that 
represents the North Korean nation-state, and thus “other” to South Koreanness. North Korean 
settlers are expected to get rid of ethnic markers as North Koreans and transform themselves 
into modern citizen-subjects of South Korea (Choo, 2006, 577). 
 
Who is considered to be “real” Korean, and why does it matter? Timothy Lim’s article “Who 
is Korean? Migration, Immigration, and the Challenge of Multiculturalism in Homogeneous 
Societies” (2009) helps shed light on this difficult subject: 
 
To be “truly” Korean, one must not only have Korean blood, but must also embody the values, 
the mores, and the mindset of Korean society. This helps explain why overseas Koreans (from 
China, Russia, Japan, the United States and other countries throughout the world have not fit 
into Korean society as Koreans. They are different, “real” Koreans recognize, despite sharing 
the same blood. At the same time, those who lack a “pure blood” relationship, no matter how 
acculturated they may be, have also been rejected as outsiders. This rejection, more 
importantly, has generally led to severe forms of discrimination (Lim, 2009, 1) 
 
As Lim writes there is an extremely narrow concept of “Koreaness”, that categorizes who is, 
and who is not classified as Korean. Victoria, who arrived in South Korea six years ago, told 
me the story about when she went to a PC-bang, an internet cafe
26
, a few months after she 
arrived. She went inside and asked the clerk how much they charged for the hour. The answer 
she got back shocked her as she was told it was not for foreigners. She was confused because 
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 Internet cafes are where you pay to use the internet and they are all over South Korea. 
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they were speaking Korean. She thought to herself, “why is he saying it is not for foreigners?” 
She told me how she said: “Good thing I am Korean, I am from North Korea.” Victoria 
proceeded to show her South Korean citizenship and her South Korean student identification, 
but without success. She had a struggle with her identity because of that incident. “Am I not 
South Korean? I though South Korea was also my country. Why does it matter where I am 
from? I am me.” When she came to South Korea she thought they shared a common identity. 
“I thought that we are the same people. But coming to South Korea I now know that South 
Korean people think differently.” In South Korea modernity itself is used as an ethnic marker, 
and there is an “othering” process at work:   
 
It is not ethnically marked difference per se that is at stake in such “othering” processes but 
rather that “racial and cultural difference become coded ways of talking about other 
differences that matter, differences in power and in interests” (Lutz and Collins, 1993, 156). 
This is especially clear when no differences exist prior to the division, as in the case of 
partitioned states like Korea (Choo, 2006, 578). 
 
The creation of “another Korean” is not something just Lim discusses in his paper, but others 
such as Sonia Ryang (2012), Choo Hae-yeon (2006), and Joanna Hosaniak (2011) have also 
grappled with this topic. In Korea as a whole, the notion of shared blood, homogenous 
ethnicity or both is the source of identity. But, as Lim writes, even if you share blood and a 
Korean ethnicity, there are other factors used to distinguish you as “other”. There is a focus on 
differences, not similarities: 
 
Koreans do not employ a concept of difference that evokes the positive sense of a melting pot 
or multiculturalism often found in European and North American societies. Difference is 
assumed to be negative (Grinker, 1998, 269). 
 
Koreanness is unfortunately an elusive idea that slips through your fingers as soon as 
someone tries to define what it really is. Therefore Koreanness is often recognized by what it 
is not, through some sort of negative identification. The fact that there exists a “difference”, a 
negative contrast, is just as necessary as the positive definition of Koreanness. One might say 
that the former is indispensable to the latter. In the beginning you start to differentiate 
between who belongs to a particular group and who does not. There is an inclusion and 
exclusion of who is inside and who is outside, creating oppositions between two or more 
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groups. Notably, those who share Korean blood, like the Joseonjok ethnic Koreans from 
China, ethnic Koreans from overseas, or North Koreans, are considered another type of 
Korean. 
 
In a similar vein, Korea’s “brethren” from China, the Joseonjok, who generally speak Korean 
and have a strong cultural affinity, have also suffered discriminatory treatment and have 
effectively been identified as outsiders. This suggests that the primary issue is not necessarily 
the unwillingness or inability of marginalized groups to “assimilate” (or at least try to 
assimilate) into Korean society, but rather it is the hitherto impenetrable barrier of a rigidly 
and narrowly defined conception of belongingness and identity (Lim, 2009, 6). 
 
Fredrik Barth (1969) in “Ethnic groups and Boundaries” argues that we should focus on the 
cultural boundaries that define groups, and not on the cultural content of the group. The 
argument is that identity is something created where people meet. Within an ethnic group 
there can be conflict, and there can exist differences between members. But what is important 
is that as a group they agree that they are different from other groups they can contrast 
themselves against. By focusing on boundaries, we can say something about who is included 
in a community, but by the same token we can also say something about who is not part of the 
community. Such boundaries need not be national borders or ethnic boundaries, but social 
boundaries more generally (Barth 1969). 
A perception of having the same ethnicity as others normally builds on one or more 
common characteristics: the same history and origins, the same language and culture, the 
same way of life and traditions, and the same religion. Apart from the vague term "origin" this 
is a collection of cultural traits. Barth considers ethnicity as a fundamental social 
phenomenon. He sets up a set of criteria describing an ethnic group, and says it is a group of 
people who is biologically self-reproductive. This group of people share fundamental cultural 
values and expresses them in obvious ways and at the same time forms a field of interaction 
and communication. The last criterion is that they attribute to themselves a separate identity 
and is ascribed a separate identity by others, so that they form a unit distinguishable from 
other comparable groups (Barth 1969). The last specification concerns the subjective 
perception of themselves and others. Self-identification and identification by others as a group 
has in recent decades been more central to ethnic definitions than the other three criteria.  
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(…) there may be a continuous flow of people and information across ethnic 
boundaries even though they are maintained as boundaries. If such divisions are 
maintained, this must be because they have some social relevance. In the relationship 
between the sedentary Fur and the nomadic Baggara in the Sudan, for example, there 
is an economic complementarity. They are mutually dependent on commodity 
exchange and occupy complementary ecological niches. As Gunnar Haaland (1969) 
has shown, Fur may become Baggara by changing their way of life, just as Leach 
(1954) showed that Kachin could become Shan; but the ethnic boundary separating the 
groups remains untouched in the process (Hylland Eriksen, 2001, 263). 
Lim does not bring up North Korean defectors in his article, but there are similarities between 
North Korean defectors and the Joseonjok, in that they both speak Korean, and have a “strong 
cultural affinity” to Korea. Especially immigrants, or people coming from other countries 
outside of the “host country”, are expected to pledge allegiance to the nation they live in, and 
not the “homeland”. North Koreans live on the Korean Peninsula, but are still not considered 
“real” Koreans. North Koreans do not fit the South Korean definition of “Koreanness”. North 
Koreans have Korean blood and ethnicity, but are discriminated against, and thereby a stigma 
is created. 
 
 
STIGMA 
 
In “Stigma”, Erving Goffman (1963) emphasizes the importance of impression management 
concerning stigma. Stigma pertains to the shame that a person may feel when he or she fails to 
meet other people's standards – physically, culturally or characterwise.  
 
When a stranger comes into our presence, then, first appearances are likely to enable us to 
anticipate his category and attributes, his "social identity" [...] We lean on these anticipations 
that we have, transforming them into normative expectations, into righteously presented 
demands. [...] It is [when an active question arises as to whether these demands will be filled] 
that we are likely to realize that all along we had been making certain assumptions as to what 
the individual before us ought to be. [These assumed demands and the character we impute to 
the individual will be called] virtual social identity. The category and attributes he could in 
fact be proved to possess will be called his actual social identity. While the stranger is present 
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before us, evidence can arise of his possessing an attribute that makes him different from 
others [...]. He is thus reduced in our minds from a whole [...] to a tainted, discounted one 
(Goffman 1963, 2-3). 
 
The existence of a stigma limits and changes the impression management and interaction 
between “stigmatized” and “normals”. Having a stigma is socially discrediting, and being 
stigmatized, the person is reduced from a whole to a rejected stereotype. The process of 
stigma is highly situational, and the role of stigmatized and stigmatizer may vary from 
different settings, therefore the process of stigma is dynamic and complex. The emphasis on 
idealized, normative identity and conduct limits the ability of the “stigmatized” individual to 
achieve full social acceptance by the population that he or she is forced to assimilate into. For 
the “stigmatized” individual who attempts to "pass" as “normal” they would employ 
"disidentifiers" to establish him or herself as "normal" (Goffman, 1963, 44). “Disidentifiers” 
are symbols stigmatized people use to cover their stigma and pass as “normal”. Feelings of 
ambivalence and alienation are likely to emerge as a result of limited social intercourse.  The 
informants I met had indeed tried to erase their North Korean ethnic markers, took active 
measures in changing the way they spoke, and dressed and acted as best as they could in order 
to pass as "normals", to use Goffman's term. What they did and how will be introduced in the 
section below and the next chapter. In the next chapter I will discuss how North Korean 
defectors turn to consumption in an effort to shed their “North Korean markers”.  
 
 
ATTAINING SOUTH KOREAN MARKERS 
 
At Hanawon they try to help defectors erase their North Korean accents. As one of their first 
meetings with South Korea they are told almost from the beginning that being North Korean 
is not a value that is essentially attractive in South Korea. Their North Korean dialect is in 
essence not good enough, and they should change it to sound more South Korean, preferably 
more like the standard Seoulite dialect. Instead of encouraging the defectors to proudly 
announce their identity as North Koreans, they are told that their identity as North Koreans is 
something they should alter, and preferably hide, according to Sulli. In the introduction I 
quoted Choo saying that “North Korean settlers are expected to get rid of their ethnic markers 
and transform themselves into modern citizen-subjects of South Korea” (Choo 2006, 576). 
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Dialect, (sattori), is one trait according to which a Korean person can easily identify others, 
and especially North Koreans as they have a different way of intonation and enunciating 
words. Loanwords from other languages, especially English, is commonly used in South 
Korean colloquial speech as an effect of globalization. Foreign loanwords like “menu”, 
“coffee”, “wife”, “stress” and “hot” are now a part of the vocabulary in South Korea, forming 
what people like to call “Konglish”. This is frustrating for North Koreans who only have very 
limited exposure to English. North Koreans are not familiar with these words because the 
Kim regime decreed that only “pure” Korean should be used. In Sung Min-kyu’s article “An 
Abuse of Culture” she mentions a manual by The Korea Hana Foundation called “Manuals for 
North Koreans’ Successful Social Adaption” (2015, 51). This manual takes up “host language 
integration” among a wide range of topics. The term “host language” is indicative for the 
differences between the Korean spoken in the two Koreas: “In these assimilationist 
instructions North Korean can hardly find any equal access to South Korean society. Being 
national to them means merely conforming to South Korean values” (Sung, 2015, 52). 
In the 1990s many South Korean popular television shows started making fun of North 
Korean speech styles: 
 
which ends up assigning to ‘South’ Koreans ‘a discursive password’ of ‘who’s in and who’s 
out’ regarding national belonging (Hopper 1986 in Sung 2009: 445). The scheme of national 
belonging blames ‘North’ Korean settlers for the presumed differentiated speech style, 
dismissing the discursive privilege of the South Korean speech style (Sung 2009, 445). 
 
A discourse decides what knowledge is regarded as possible, acceptable and true within a 
social field. Discourse is closely related to power. Foucault believes power defines knowledge 
and is defined by knowledge (Foucault 1980). Persons who have the "right" knowledge about 
a topic define what is true and not:  
 
Language, codes of conduct and relevant skills are defined, and mastered, by the 
majority. The majority defines the cultural framework relevant for life careers, and 
thus has a surplus of symbolic capital over the minorities. For this reason, many 
minority members may be disqualified in the labour market and other contexts where 
their skills are not valued (Hylland Eriksen, 2001, 285) 
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The knowledge that becomes the dominant often excludes other types of knowledge about a 
topic. Hiding her identity as a North Korean is something Sulli, told me she does. She has 
learned how to speak with a Seoulite accent. After living in South Korea for eight years she 
has mastered it well according to my South Korean friend who met Sulli. But on occasion 
someone would ask her where her hometown is. She would say it is in Gwangju or Jeolla 
province in southern South Korea. She was told by other defectors that the southern dialect in 
South Korea sounds similar to the North Korean. Sometimes she told me that someone would 
say her dialect did not sound from that area. At that time she told me: “I wanted to hit them. 
Why is it so important for South Koreans to know where my hometown is?” Even though 
someone would jokingly call her a country “bumpkin”, she accepted it because at least they 
would recognize her as a South Korean. Identity is created in interaction with others, and here 
special emphasis is on the other's perception of us. Stigmatized persons have to be self-
consciously aware of how they present themselves, and the impression they make on others. 
They have to constantly be aware of the way they present themselves, but keeping this up can 
be very hard. When we see a stranger, we attribute to him or her certain characteristics. These 
characteristics may not be consistent with the person's actual social identity (Goffman 1963).  
 
HIDING AN ETHNIC IDENTITY IN NORWAY 
 
Hiding, or attempting to hide, a stigma or ethnic identity is not an isolated event just 
happening to North Koreans in South Korea, but can occur wherever there is a minority who 
wants to fit in with the majority for different reasons. A comparative example would be from 
Harald Eidheim’s article (1971) from a mixed Norwegian- Sami community in Northern 
Norway. His material shows a situation: 
 
where an ethnic status (or identity) is, in a sense, illegitimate, and therefore not acted out in 
institutional inter-ethnic behavior. Nevertheless, this very illegitimacy has definite 
implications in the process of role-taking in elementary interaction and thus adds form to 
inter-ethnic relations (Eidheim 1971, 50). 
 
At the time Eidheim did his fieldwork the costal Sami were a stigmatized group in the 
Norwegian society. Eidheim shows how the use of ethnic labels attached to communities, 
families and individual persons are in use between persons having contrasting as well as 
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similar identities (Eidheim 1971). Language becomes the most obvious contrast for the ethnic 
markers between the Sami and Norwegian population. Just as in the case among the North 
Korean refugees I talked to, about their maneuverings in Seoul, Eidheim’s article shows how 
members of a stigmatized ethnic identity “seek to qualify themselves as full participants in the 
Norwegian society. In order to obtain this membership they have to develop techniques to 
avoid or tolerate sanctions from the local Norwegian population” (Eidheim, 1971, 51). The 
Sami would “under-communicate” their ethnic identities as Sami in the public sphere. In these 
public spheres the Sami would “over-communicate” what they thought of as Norwegian 
cultural markers, to distance themselves from their stigma. He says that the basis of this is 
because in order to achieve material and social goods, and to participate in the opportunities 
in society, “people have to get rid of, or cover up, those social characteristics which 
Norwegians take as signs of Lappishness” (Eidheim 1971, 56). 
 
 
STEREOTYPES 
 
This fear of disclosing their identity as North Koreans probably stems from how they are 
perceived in South Korea. There is a stereotype where North Koreans are popularly portrayed 
as lazy, state leeches, spies, criminals or communists (Tandia, 2012). Similar stereotypes are 
mentioned by Eidheim in his article about how Norwegians see the Sami population living in 
Norway. There were false stereotypes about the Sami being “dirty”, “drunken” and “pagan” 
(Hylland Eriksen, 2001, 266). Stereotyping is a common result of people’s social information 
limitations and experiences. The knowledge that becomes the dominant often excludes other 
types of knowledge about a topic. What happens in such processes is the creation of labels; 
"We", "them", "good" and "bad", and it is seen as the "truth". "They" are dirty, abnormal and 
dangerous, while "we" are the opposite, when creating this image of "the other". When a 
characteristic is imputed to someone long enough, it acquires a certain degree of truth, though 
it may not be true, or is partially true. In this way the discourse becomes hegemonic, it 
becomes the dominant way to see something, which cannot be discussed further since it 
becomes reality. In this way knowledge and power is tied together (Foucault 1980). 
In Andrei Lankov’s article “Bitter Taste of Paradise: North Korean refugees in South 
Korea” (2006) he mentions an article published by the newspaper Dong-A Ilbo from 2004 
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where the newspaper found it necessary to publish misperceptions and stereotypes about 
North Korean defectors: 
 
The list includes such statements as: "The financial assistance to the defectors is too large"; 
"My tax money is spent on the defectors"; "Defectors do not pay taxes themselves"; 
"Defectors are largely involved in criminal activities"; "There are spies among the defectors"; 
"Only useless people defect from the North"; "What do we get by accepting defectors?" Even 
though the article's author, Chu Seongha, tries to refute all these ideas one by one as 
groundless or exaggerated, the very list is telling enough (Lankov, 2006, 15-16). 
 
The South Korean media depicts defectors as outsiders: “not too differently from how it treats 
ethnic Koreans from China, who are often stereotyped as criminals” (Sunwoo 2014). 
Whenever I met with a South Korean stranger who wondered why I was in Seoul, and I told 
them I researched North Koreans the question I would receive often was: “Why?” “Why 
would you study them? South Koreans are also good for study.” These comments were telling 
in that there exists a distinction between “us” and “them”. South Koreans have different 
impressions of the refugees; some were not aware that there were that many refugees in South 
Korea, while others were skeptical of strangers in general. “There is already stiff competition 
for jobs” one South Korean man told me, and meant since they had a difficult time with the 
high competition for jobs already, they should not share with "those who did not belong." 
After getting into a discussion with a South Korean stranger he said to me: "Why should I hire 
a refugee when there are so many South Koreans who do not have a job?" Sonia Ryang 
explains that there are many ways South Koreans are critical of North Korean defectors: 
 
It is important to register that the complex nature of prejudicial treatment meted out to North 
Korean migrants reflects South Korean society’s own moral ambiguities. For example, South 
Koreans are critical of North Korean migrants who are unwilling to take up so-called 3D 
occupations: dirty, dangerous, and difficult jobs (Suh 2002:76). Behind such criticism lies the 
logic that these are the kinds of jobs North Korean refugees deserve, the assumption being that 
they should consider themselves fortunate even to be alive, accompanied by feelings of 
disbelief that they dare to shun this type of work. Another factor encouraging disdain toward 
migrants is the assumption in some sectors of South Korean society that migrants expect 
permanent financial support. In addition, the fact that many have left their families behind and 
betrayed their country is seen as a sign of a personality defect and a lack of moral integrity 
(see Jeon 2000). (Ryang, 2012, 7) 
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In the book “Aquariums of Pyongyang” (2001) Kang Chol-hwan expresses how himself has 
been “the target of such misperceptions: whenever I dress elegantly, people look at me with 
suspicion” (Kang and Rigoulot, 2001, 230). He says that the “poverty and economic 
inferiority are too often taken as a reflection of some natural inferiority” (Kang and Rigoulot, 
2001, 230).  
  
THE FEMINIZATION OF NORTH KOREA AND NORTH KOREAN WOMEN 
 
These misconceptions are just a few of many images South Koreans have about North 
Koreans. The phrase “namnam buknyeo”27, which literally translates “Southern man, 
Northern woman” shapes perceptions on the ideal couple being a man from the South and a 
woman from the North. This phrase dates pre national division, but also suggests in gendered 
terms a hierarchical relationship between the two nations. 
 
The implication of the gendered discourse of the South and the North, which are respectively 
represented as man and woman, becomes evident: such a hegemonic dimension of nationalism 
is the demonstration that the politics of national identification is anything but the form of 
cultural differentiation (Sung, 2009, 445-446). 
 
The South is characterized as a masculine subject while the North is feminized. 
 
In Said’s parlance, the post-colonial criticism calls particular attention to the feminization of 
North Korea, which recalls the Orientalism about North Korea, thereby positioning South 
Korea as mimicking Western hegemonic culture. Said argues that the ‘almost uniform 
association between orient and sex’ has facilitated a ‘male conception of the world’ (Said 
1978:188, 207 quoted in Sung 2009: 448). 
 
This proverb of “namnam buknyeo” has appeared as a title on movies and sitcoms on both TV 
and radio. Matchmaking services have also adopted the name as an indicator for their 
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services. Matchmaking and dating agencies has been a part of Korean society, both in the 
North and South. Traditionally marriage was seen as a union of two families, not just a 
commitment between two individuals, with the purpose of producing a male heir to the family 
line.   
 
A go-between or matchmaker, usually a middle-aged woman, carried on the negotiation 
between the two families involved who, because of a very strict law of exogamy, sometimes 
did not know each other and often lived in different communities (Savada and Shaw 1990b). 
 
In October 2009 South Korean newspaper “Segye Ilbo” reported that by 2014 there will be 
382,000 men who will not be able to find Korean brides (Won, 2010, 101). Because of this 
“marriage crisis” South Korean men began looking across borders for a potential wife. 
International marriage between Koreans and non-Korean, mostly from Southeast Asian 
countries has become more common. Non-Koreans, Joseonjok and North Korean women 
have been able to fill in this void (Freeman 2005).  
 
There is a shortage of “marriageable women” for certain groups of Korean men—specifically, 
for never-married men in rural areas and previously married (divorced or widowed) or 
disabled men of “low socio-economic status” in urban areas (Lim, 2009, 4) 
 
But there is still the preference for someone who shares the same values and background. 
Like one of my South Korean friends said: “I could date a foreigner, but I would marry a 
Korean”. During my fieldwork I got the opportunity to have an interview with a marriage 
matching agency called “Namnam Buknyeo”. I met with the owner of the agency, Mr. Hong 
Seong-woo. As we arrived at the office there were many women working there. During the 
interview we were told that most of the women working there were North Korean defectors. 
At the table in his office we could see wedding invitations and news articles. He had a binder 
with different statistics from the Ministry of Unification, as well as his own statistics from his 
company. He told me to look at the binder to get an overview of the statistics. “Namnam 
buknyeo” is his own business. He has a copyright on the name. He has patent on nine other 
items connected to the business as well. “I started the business 8 years ago, in 2006. My 
company is the oldest marriage matching company matching North Koreans with South 
Koreans. The main purpose of this agency is that people marry with someone that they see 
being married to for a long time and being happy. It is not about just matching people.”  
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While we are having the interview Mr. Hong gets a phone call from a man from 
Daejeon. He was on his way to Seoul, and wanted to come to Mr. Hong’s office that day. 
After he finished the phone call he went back in the binder to show me the news articles and 
TV appearances he has been on. KBS, The Times, Financial Times, Chosun Ilbo, Globalpost, 
Korea Herald, Wall Street were just some newspapers that have interviewed him. Some 
articles were in English and others in Korean.  
Not everyone can sign up for the services this marriage agency provides. Those who 
are unemployed, have bad financial credit, have a criminal background and those who are 
physically disabled cannot apply. Mr. Hong explains this by saying: “I want the North Korean 
women to be taken care of, and therefore I have a few restrictions on who can apply for our 
services.” He also has restrictions on gender so only North Korean women and South Korean 
men can apply. “North Korean men have a reputation of being too conservative and abusive. 
While South Korean women have a reputation of being too needy and independent.”  
I found it interesting that he said that the South Korean women are “too independent” as a 
negative trait. He said that South Korean women place a lot of emphasis on the man’s 
education, job and subsequently his salary and outer appearance. Unfortunately for recently 
arrived male defectors it is harder to fulfill these requirements. “South Korean men look for 
two things: appearance and looks, and personality. North Korean women are natural 
beauties, and even if they wanted to fix something most of them would not because they don't 
have the finances to do so.” According to the images of beauty in South Korea, Northern 
women’s beauty lies in being pure and naturally pretty, in contrast to the beauty in the South 
which is imagined to consist in sexiness, often surgically enhanced. He credits the North 
Koreans: “North Koreans have another mentality than South Koreans. The older generation 
South Koreans has the same mentality, and that is: “if it is broken, we fix it. They do not get a 
new one. While the younger generation has the mentality of ‘use and dispose’.” 
The South Korean men have to pay a fee to be a part of the database. “It is free for 
North Koreans because when they come to South Korea they only bring their bodies and 
nothing more. Even with the money they get from the government it is not enough to spend on 
other things then the necessities. South Koreans have to pay so that the business knows they 
have money to support their wife, and also my business would not work without money.” He 
claims to have matched about 480 couples, with only 10 getting a divorce. The Korea Hana 
Foundation did a survey of 8299 defectors. The result was 10.2% of the defector men married 
South Korean women, and 32.7% of the defector women married South Korean men (Seoul 
Sinmun 2012).  
80 
The demographics of who uses the agency service have changed. When he first started 
he only helped men in their late 30s to 40s. These were men who were too old to date and 
needed help. Nowadays men in their 20s come to him for help. He tells a story about a 25 
year old man whose former South Korean girlfriend demanded too many things, both material 
and physical, and even cheated on him. Even though he was young and could find a girlfriend 
on his own, he did not want to date South Korean girls anymore. Therefore, he contacted Mr. 
Hongs business to help him get a North Korean girlfriend. “Even if North and South is 
divided, they are the same people. But because of how the South have been progressing, new 
foreign words and technology is being used, and if there is too big an age gap it may be hard 
for the woman to adapt. They (husbands) help them (wives) with the language which is the 
most difficult obstacle when they come here. Most people are shy and do not want to come off 
as stupid if they ask what a tomato is. They feel ashamed asking for the meaning and 
explanation of English words.” He tells us how people graduated from Yonsei, people who 
have studied in Paris, lawyers, doctors and even a judge are in his database. “Before, when I 
first started, it was mostly blue collar workers who came to my office. However it has been 
changing and now white collar workers, people with good jobs and high education want to 
apply.” As we can see from my interview with Mr. Hong, North Korean defector women are 
accepted in South Korean society better than North Korean defector men. This is mostly 
because of the “marriage crisis” South Korea is experiencing. 
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Chapter V 
Consumerism and modernity  
 
This chapter is about how North Korean defectors use South Korean consumption patterns to 
“transform” into “modern South Koreans” by acquiring material goods, wealth, consuming 
Western goods, and pursuing a modern lifestyle with whatever that may include. North 
Koreans who seek refuge in the south face a myriad of social hurdles. Transitioning from a 
planned economy to a market economy is almost an overnight phenomenon for North Korean 
defectors. Although there has been gradual reform in North Korea where underground black 
markets and other markets have made its way into the society, it can almost not be compared 
to the extent of choice and options in the liberal market economy of South Korea
28
. The 
collapse of the North Korean economy and the Public Distribution system (PDS) created 
conditions where money and bribery have taken over the role of songbun. There has been a 
growing of grassroot initiatives happening in North Korea. This has paved the path for 
individual initiatives and opportunities as well as a breeding ground for corruption (Collins, 
2012, 5). In socialism, distribution economy, consumption and spending were heavily 
regulated. After they left North Korea people were suddenly presented with multiple choice 
and assortment. It is a chaotic and unpredictable landscape to navigate through. 
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 The generation that grew up in North Korea after the famine of the early 1990s, are 
often called the “Black Market Generation”, or the “Jangmadang”. They are different from 
their parents’ generation as they have little or no recollection of a socialist economy where the 
North Korean state provided food through the PDS. They have also experienced more 
information seeping into the North Korean society from China. The black market has 
provided DVDs, USBs and Chinese cellphones. They have sources of information other than 
those provided by the state. Because of markets and a higher influx of information, the 
Jangmadang generation is more capitalistic and individualistic compared to their parent 
generation (Park Yeon-mi 2014). 
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THE KOREAN DREAM  
 
Connected to Beck’s theories on modernity and second modernity, it is interesting to pay 
attention to how the South Korean society has developed from the early 1960s until the 
current society of today. As previously mentioned, South Korea went through a 
transformation on many levels. The economic growth South Korea has experienced during the 
last five decades has for the most part opened up for a South Korean middle-class in the larger 
cities. Citizens of Seoul, Seoulites, are influenced by the images of modernity and 
consumption coming from abroad, and this creates different ways of competition, and puts a 
pressure to achieve and perform in the competitive society. As many North Korean defectors 
before reaching South Korea, watched South Korean movies, dramas and TV-shows, many 
also had high expectations of what life in South Korea would be like. Like Victoria mentioned 
she did not think of leaving North Korea until she saw Titanic, which changed her mindset 
about the outside world.  
Many defectors dream of a new beginning, a “Korean dream”, but South Korea may 
not be the dream country they anticipated. Along with living in a country with freedom and 
individuality, they have to take responsibility for their own lives and trajectory. Nana said 
how before she arrived in South Korea she had very high expectations about her new life. She 
thought that South Korea would be the easiest place for her to live, because they share a 
common history and ancestry. However, when she started to maneuver in the society she 
realized that it was like living in a foreign country. The things she felt she would have in 
common where actually the things she started to hide, such as the Korean language. She, as a 
consequence, became withdrawn.  
When defectors first arrive in South Korea, they feel confident about their future. After 
a while, they realize that six decades of division have created differences between the two 
countries.  
 
(…) comprehending Korean is the last handicap that most would want to recognize, as it runs 
counter to a fundamental belief in a homogeneous Korean language and culture - the myth of 
oneness - that forms the very foundation of their fragile claim to belonging in South Korea 
(Chung, 2008, 16). 
 
Park told me the story of when he graduated from Hanawon. His father was already in Seoul 
so he moved in with him. When I asked him what was the most difficult thing he experienced 
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since he came to South Korea he laughed and said “studying English”. Park was the one of 
my informants who spoke the best English. He said he had learned to read the word “sale” in 
English quickly because it was everywhere. Park went to the local shopping mall one early 
morning and saw signs saying “puktan seil”29, “bomb sale”. He was so confused because he 
had been told that South Korea was pacifist, at least compared to North Korea. He was so 
surprised that they were selling bombs to common people in South Korea. He stood in line 
intrigued by this “bomb sale”. He got even more confused when he was lining up between old 
grandmothers and grandfathers. As soon as the mall opened one grandmother elbowed him to 
get before him in line. In front of him there were tables of discounted clothes. He realized that 
“bomb sale”, did not mean that they are selling actual bombs, but that the sales were so 
explosive or shocking. This was when Park realized that even though he can read and speak 
Korean it does not mean that he understands the meaning.  
Smartphones were very useful, Harry told me, because if there was something he did 
not understand he could just search for it on his phone and there would be clear explanations, 
pictures and videos. Although smartphones are useful in their own right, they also are not 
cheap. Public Radio International (PRI) published an article explaining that a new free 
smartphone application has launched to help defectors (Strother 2015). The application is 
called Univoca, short for “unification vocabulary”. Users could either type or take a picture of 
an unknown word and get a translation in North Korean (Strother 2015). When I arrived back 
in South Korea August 2015 I met up with Harry and the other defectors to hear how their life 
had been since I left June 2014. One of the things I was wondering about was this new 
application, if they had even heard of it, and in that case, if they used it. None of them had 
heard of it. Park explained this by saying “Because we left Hanawon some time ago we do not 
get all the recent information which could have helped in our daily life.” 
 
 
DEFECTORS AS CONSUMERS 
 
Arriving in South Korea, North Korean defectors are confused by the entirely different 
political, economic and social system. Alongside this the defectors have to try to adapt to the 
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society while at the same time experiencing change in “residential status, social position, 
family, and living environment” (Sohn, 2013, 110). A number of studies have pointed out that 
defectors of all ages experience difficulties adapting to South Korean society, both at school, 
at work, and in their local communities. Many deal with mental problems such as post-
traumatic stress syndrome, loneliness, low self-worth and isolation (Hosaniak, 2011, 41).  
I will not dwell on the psychological adaption problems. But the newest data from the 
MoU suggest there is a decline in defectors experience of happiness and satisfaction of life in 
South Korea. South Korea is among the 34 industrialized OECD member countries the 
country with the highest suicide rate. Mental health, depression and suicidal thoughts are 
taboo and stigmatized in South Korea, which makes it very difficult for those suffering to 
make the effort to seek help. The report “Health at a Glance”, issued by the OECD in 2015, 
states that South Koreans are reluctant to seek medical help and among the OECD countries is 
the country that uses the least antidepressants (Kim Se-jeong  2015). This correlation between 
South Korea being the leading country in suicide rates in the OECD, and the fact that medical 
help is rarely used is frightening. According to figures from 2013, about 28,5 people per 
100,000 committed suicide. This is more than double the average of 12 per 100,000 in OECD 
(Kim Se-jeong  2015). Interestingly enough, figures from the MoU suggest that 15.2 percent 
of the North Korean defectors who died in South Korea so far in 2015, died because of 
suicide. North Korean defectors end up taking their lives on a three times higher scale than 
South Koreans (Shim 2015).  
 
“Defectors described their social status in North Korea as “upper class” in 12.7 percent of 
cases, “middle class” in 36.6 percent and “lower class” in 50.5 percent. Currently in South 
Korea, only 3.3 percent of them said they are “upper class”, and 23.1 percent think they are 
“middle class”. Those regarding themselves as “lower class” amounted to 73.2 percent” (Choi 
2015). 
 
The vast majority of defectors now perceive themselves as lower class in South Korea. 
Departing a country where even though there were classes, people of the same class lived in 
the same communities, largely masking the social gaps. Arriving in South Korea where the 
social gaps are more obvious, the social fall is easier to recognize.  
Sohn in her article “Living in a Consumer Society: Adaptation Experiences of North 
Korean Youth Defectors in South Korea” was told by her participants:  
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“I thought if I came to Korea, I didn’t have to work that hard to have my wallet full,” (Case 
15, male, 23). Another participant expressed her disappointment: On TV, they all live in 
elegant houses and drive nice cars. ‘Is Korea that rich?’ I thought back then. ‘I will be well off 
in Korea.’ But when I came, it wasn’t like that. (Case 13, female, 25) (Sohn, 2013, 118) 
 
Focusing on consumerism is interesting because as most of my informants said one of the 
main reasons they left North Korea was economic. Some left because they did not have food 
on a daily basis, and some left because they hoped for a better economic life for themselves 
compared to what they had in the North. What is interesting about defectors experiences as 
consumers in South Korea is that they came from a socialist society. North Korea has control 
over what is produced and distributed in the country. In North Korea, citizens were not 
considered “consumers”, as the state provided them with what they would need with respect 
to housing, clothes and food. They used products produced by the state, and did not have to 
take in consideration personal decisions such as where to purchase, where the bargains are or 
whether to negotiate the price. North Korea has altered some of their policies towards a 
market economy such as the “7.1 Economy Management Improvement Act” (Choe and Cho, 
2013), where small markets are allowed to operate. Still, it cannot be compared to the extent 
of the South Korean market environment which imports and exports goods, and where there is 
mass production and massive quantities of choice. As well as the huge assortment of products 
to buy, there are many places to buy them: 
 
modern department stores, general discount stores, traditional Korean market where varieties 
of specialty stores are densely congregated, small neighborhood stores, home shopping 
networks on television, Internet stores, and even mobile trucking stores (Choe and Cho, 2013, 
555). 
 
The market is an essential key in a capitalistic society, where the consumers have power in 
what and where to buy. But not having the sufficient knowledge of how a market economy 
works can have implications for defectors. Not having enough and detailed information on 
how products and the South Korean systems works, many felt wary of buying. Although they 
could have asked questions, they were afraid to ask because sometimes they did not know 
exactly what to ask.  
Consumption can help individuals to distinguish themselves with the means of 
economical capital. Pierre Bourdieu (1995) in “Distinction” introduces three dimensions of 
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capital; economic, cultural and social, in his theory on class. His ethnography is based on 
1960s French society. Economic capital is the capital a person has in reference to material 
wealth, how much money a person has in the bank and may be used to acquire property, to 
take one example. Cultural capital refers to non-financial social assets such as language, 
education, appearance and dress, which can contribute to social mobility beyond economic 
capital. Cultural capital essentially refers to how cultured one is. Cultural capital can be 
converted, on certain conditions, into economic capital. While social capital is a private 
resource one has in virtue of belonging to a social status, it is based on mutual recognition of 
symbolic difference. Social network and group membership are central forms of social 
capital. To possess social capital is to be rich in connections, and it is others, not the person 
himself/herself, who is the origin of his/her social wealth. The topic of “Distinction” is taste 
and how taste manifests itself for different people. Bourdieu asked questions based on 
preference in clothing, furniture, art, music and leisure activities. Taste is used by classes to 
distinguish between others, and thereby classes can be stratified. The different choices people 
make according to taste are all distinctions. Consumption affects everyday life of everyone in 
this world as it conveys certain ways we as consumers should aspire to be, by buying.  
 
 
LEARNING BY DOING 
 
Thus, in a consumer society, consumption is not only an economic behavior of 
pursuing efficient choices, but is also a cultural behavior with its own unique lifestyle, 
especially for the young generation whose cultural identity is in flux. North Korean 
youth defectors who had been accustomed to a lifestyle of obedience to given orders 
may experience difficulties in adapting to an environment where they make choices, 
including making decisions as consumers (Sohn, 2013, 111).  
 
Sulli liked to go to Costco which is an American wholesale supermarket. One time I went 
with Sulli and Jenny to Costco, primarily to buy meat. Even though we were supposed to only 
buy meat, we ended up walking all the aisles at both floors of Costco. Top floor is for 
homeware and appliances, while the floor below it is where the food is located. Sulli would 
point out which brands where good, and the things she had tried before. Snickers chocolate 
bar, Kirkland (Costco’s own brand) potato chips and Kirkland honey made its way down in 
her basket. Sulli had brought me because she was puzzled I had never heard of or been to a 
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Costco before. Before we went home we stopped at the Costco food court, where one can buy 
low quality food at very low prices. As I was considering my options she guided me towards 
the things that she liked, and thought I would like as well. It was clear to me that this was a 
place she knew well, and frequently visited. As we were sitting down eating our hot dogs and 
pizza Sulli said “At first I did not know anything. I would just go to Shinsegae30 and buy what 
I needed. Now I know everything so I now go to many different places”.  
When defectors first arrived they did not know the values or reasonableness of certain 
goods, and would go to more expensive supermarkets. Smaller markets would often require 
them to haggle, but they did not know to which price to haggle down to, risking to reveal 
themselves as North Koreans. Krystal were even afraid that she would be treated differently if 
her identity as North Korean were revealed, such as by increasing the price on what she was 
trying to buy. As we learn through the experiences of Harry and Sulli, arriving in a market 
based society has its challenges. With only the subsidies from Hanawon as economic capital, 
it was important to them to make sound economic decisions but they lacked the knowledge to 
do so. 
Defectors wanted many things, but realized they did not have the money. Sulli 
revealed that she bought lottery tickets hoping she would win the big prize. Becoming so 
attentive to money, they thought about what they had been told in North Korea that capitalism 
were the ultimate evil. Although they did not want to become absorbed too much in the 
financial difficulties, they knew they needed money to live. Many though South Korea was a 
paradise, where finding work was easy. Nana explains how this really let her down, and she 
became nostalgic about North Korea. For me it was a paradox: how could someone who has 
lived in a totalitarian regime be nostalgic for it? How can anyone miss not having freedom of 
expression, to be monitored by the secret police and to stand in endless lines for food? 
Distance in time can cause the strangest beliefs when the present, is characterized by tighter 
economy and a fall in living standards, “as they compete for a living in a society that mostly 
rejects them and their past, they may more readily call up positive memories of their former 
lives as sources of comfort and national pride” (Fahy, 2001, 21). Even though many expressed 
                                                          
30 
 Shinsegae is one of the big and expensive department stores with huge selections of 
both food and other stores. 
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deep satisfaction about their current life, which was a lot better than their lives in North 
Korea, they also wanted me to know that not everything was dismal in North Korea. 
Defectors perceive themselves as "poor" when they compare their position with that of 
their South Korean neighbors, but there is no doubt that an overwhelming majority still enjoy 
higher standards of living than they would ever have reached in the North. Sulli explained to 
me that she divides South Koreas population into three parts, those who are rich, middle-class 
or poor. She included herself in the lowest category. Andrei Lankov explains that even an elite 
family living in the showpiece capital of Pyongyang would not live nearly as well in terms of 
material possessions, as some defectors do in the South. But it is not only financial “poverty” 
that keeps defectors thinking that they are poor in the South.  
These comments suggest that the well-being of defectors is strongly affected not by income 
per se but by inequality and alienation between the refugees and the "host community." 
Former North Koreans quickly discover that the attitudes and values of South Korean society 
differ in many respects from what they used to consider "normal." A South Korean leftist 
journalist writes: "North Koreans, not used to capitalism, are surprised with the individualistic 
style of relations between people in the South." One of most prosperous defectors, the owner 
of a restaurant chain, Jeong Cheol-u, noted: "North Korea is poor. But its people are close to 
each other. It has nothing like the local (South Korean) heartlessness.... This is a society where 
everything is decided by money." The remarks about alienation felt by defectors can be found 
in all publications on this topic (Lankov, 2006, 14). 
 
 
CONSUMING BEAUTY  
 
Magazines and commercials say “If you buy this you will become successful” or “your life 
will better if you have this commodity in your life”.  
 
According to studies on South Korean adolescents, this population’s consumption behavior is 
a marker for social status and self-identity. They define certain brands and looks as important 
standards to evaluate themselves and others; those who do not subscribe to the same standards 
risk isolation from their peers (Ju et al., 2001; Lee and Ryou, 2011; Sohn, 1997; Sohn and 
Chun, 2004; Yoo, 2009) (Sohn, 2013, 125). 
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When defectors arrive in South Korea without economic capital they have yet to learn the 
South Korean social codes such as the way of dress, and grooming. A habitus of consumption 
is part of the everyday life of South Koreans. Style and fashion are viewed as important and 
wearing brand clothes represents high status31. Keeping up with the latest trends and styles 
can rapidly become expensive. To be modern, one has to present oneself as advised (and 
advertised) by the mainstream and hegemonic “elite”. And as defectors want to become a 
“cultural citizen”, they hope that by assuming South Korean materialistic consumption 
patterns they are “exorcising ethnicity” (Choo 2006, 591). North Koreans often misplace and 
misuse money buying commercialized symbols, as they are not used to a capitalistic economy. 
The sense that buying expensive commodities enriches your cultural capital encourages a 
competition to own the newest and the best products. All of my informants had the latest 
smartphones which they had learnt to use as if it was ingrained in them.  
When I met Harry, I could tell he was different. His physical proportions were not as 
they should for a man in his early twenties, and he looked much younger than the age he told 
me. In “Between Defector and Migrant: Identities and Strategies of North Koreans in South 
Korea” Byoung Ho Chung writes about Chul who has a children’s measuring stick on his 
wall, and who at age nineteen “stood less than five feet tall” (Chung, 2008, 2). Defectors often 
arrive in South Korea with serious health problems. After the floods and famine of 1995, 
North Korea faced a health crisis. Because of lack of food, resources and electricity, hospitals 
and medical services ran on bare minimum, and the population suffered an enduring problem 
of malnutrition. In this socialist state people depended on the state for food rations, and when 
rationing stopped, the diet was supplemented with indigestible filler from fibrous plant matter 
and husks (Demick 2010). 
Many North Korean children suffer from stunting, wasting and cognitive development 
problems. There are many reported cases of post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and 
anxiety among defectors. The constant fear of their lives both in North Korea and on their 
journey to South Korea may have led to such trauma. Informants told about food shortages 
and scarcity of other goods, fear of surveillance, suspicion, distrust and long, irregular periods 
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   I have been interested in South Korean popular culture since 2006. So although I do not have 
a full understanding of what at any time is perceived as “trendy” and “cool”, I still have an idea about 
it, having followrf the trends in South Korea for over nine years.  
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of power outages due to rationing of electricity and water. These experiences have left their 
marks on the people who lived through them. Many defectors have also suffered abuse on 
their way to South Korea, and many of them have been tangled up in human trafficking. As 
many defectors do not actively seek treatment, these problems have only exacerbated, as they 
do not fully understand the nature and potential severity of mental problems. Koreans tend to 
suppress and tolerate mental health problems instead of seeking treatment (ICG 2011, 11). 
The emphasis on appearance in South Korea is proven difficult for those who fall 
short, literally, of the highly specific criteria that supposedly make one “beautiful”. With 
South Korean society paying huge attention to appearance, many North Koreans become self-
conscious about the way they look, their height and weight being on average lower than that 
of South Koreans32: 
 
South Korean sensitivity regarding height is particularly striking. Many parents spend 
substantial sums on height-stretching treatments, in addition to special exercise programs and 
dietary regimes for their children, in the belief that taller individuals are more likely to be 
successful (Choe 2009). The bullying of short children (i.e. North Korean refugees) is 
compounded by additional factors, such as an unfamiliar accent, unfashionable clothing, a 
less-developed physique, and skin appearance that are the product of years of malnutrition and 
irregular eating. On top of all of these factors is the stigma associated with being housed in 
segregated residential areas, a common occurrence. Social attention to the physical appearance 
of North Korean refugees has the effect of inventing a “North Korean race” in South Korea 
(Ryang, 2012, 7) 
 
One of my South Korean friends’ little brother who is 16 years old, used heeled insoles in his 
shoes so he would appear taller. The maintenance of beauty is for some so necessary that they 
use costly interventions such as plastic surgery. As one of my good South Korean friends put 
it “Plastic surgery is directly related to success in (South) Korea.” Being able to purchase 
expensive clothing, plastic surgery and other materialistic things, defectors feel they are 
shedding their “North Koreanness”. 
                                                          
32 
  “The average North Korean male defector is 164.4cm tall and weighs 60.2kg, 
compared to the average South Korean man, who stands 171.4cm tall and weighs 72 kg. The 
figures for North Korean female defectors and South Korean women are: 154.2cm and 
158.4cm; 52.8kg and 57.1kg” (ICG 2011, 13). 
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But this observation does not apply with equal force to all. Dana, who is in her mid-
twenties, told me she is proud to tell people she is North Korean. She was the only one of my 
informants who told me that she was proud of her North Korean identity. However, she talked 
with a hard-won Seoulite accent and dressed and portrayed herself as if she was South 
Korean. Her hair was colored a warm brown with red hints in it, shown better when the sun 
hit her hair. Her purse was from Zara, a Spanish clothing store known for their clean and 
streamlined fashion. After we had lunch, she touched up her make-up and lipstick before we 
went into the streets of Seoul. She told me she did struggle with her identity during her first 
years in South Korea and therefore did her best to attain different markers attached to South 
Korean identity. She was not afraid to tell people she originated from North Korea. From the 
“outside” there is no difference between her and other South Korean girls, so it will be on her 
terms if she wants to disclose her background as a North Korean.   
 
Sang-Hee Sohn explains that “In a post-capitalist consumer society, such as South Korea, 
products are used to create social distinctions and to project an identity or image” (Sohn, 
2013, 123). Like Dana who now uses make-up, European fashion brands and has her hair 
dyed it did not take long for defectors to take up the consumer culture in South Korea. My 
female informants liked to spend money on make-up, fashion and food, while my male 
informants liked to have the newest gadgets such as cell phones. Harry had the newest 
Samsung Galaxy S5 when I met him, while I a month before meeting him I had bought the 
previous model, Samsung Galaxy S4, which he made a point to tell me about. Wanting to 
portray themselves as South Korean “cultural” citizens, defectors often misplace or overspend 
money.  
Sohn explains that her North Korean participants did not understand the importance of 
brands and why following fashion trends was so important for South Koreans, “but feared that 
they might be left out if they did not follow the crowd. They wanted to assimilate into the 
young South Korean culture, hoping to adjust” (Sohn, 2013, 125). One of her male 
participants age 22 said that: “I’m stressed out, following the crowd without understanding 
why. To live among them, I have to move at a similar pace, even if I can’t move at the exact 
same speed” (Sohn, 2013, 122). To survive and have the survivability can be termed as an 
implicit social knowledge, a "know-how"; it is an ability and a trait that is gained through 
practice or learning, such as one’s mother tongue. To have implicit social knowledge is to be a 
fully socialized person in society, having tools for and knowledge on how to maneuver in the 
social landscape without quite knowing why or how (Taussig 1987). Those who do not 
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behave in a manner that is consistent with what it means to be South Korean are most likely 
placed "outside" society: “Becoming a cultural citizen requires outsiders to not only 
understand a certain set of societal values, but also accept and adopt these values and cultural 
norms as their own” (Chung, 2008, 16). In order to be consumers they must have the finances 
for it. When the money from the government runs out, defectors must acquire either education 
or jobs to get an income.  
 
 
EDUCATION AS SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CAPITAL 
 
Group memberships are an important source of pride, self-esteem and self-worth, and it gives 
a sense of belonging in a social world. Social identity is a person’s sense of who they are and 
identify with based on their group membership (s). Byung Ho Chung (2008) writes: “Entering 
into a new society creates a crisis of social status. One has little control over how his or her 
background, skills, abilities, and social and cultural capital will translate into his or her 
identity in the new society” (Chung, 2008, 15). 
Education is a way to make important network connections and increase social 
mobility. But because the journey from the North to the South for many defectors took so 
long, quite a number of them lost years of schooling.  For those who have completed 
schooling in North Korea there is a discrepancy between the teaching methods in the two 
Koreas. Most North Koreans cannot compete with their South Korean classmates, and the 
dropout rate is very high. There are some South Korean universities which are willing to 
admit defectors, and where the government pays tuition. Being enrolled at a prestigious 
university can lead to job opportunities, social network, marriage prospects and it provides 
symbolic capital. Graduating from a prestigious university like the S.K.Y, would open doors 
to a middle-class lifestyle. However, maintaining a passing grade can be difficult, and most do 
not graduate from those prestigious universities they have been accepted to (Chung 2008). In 
South Korea, receiving low grades in high school virtually ensures that a person will be 
permanently confined to a badly paid manual job. Networks of alumni connections (hakyeon) 
and regional connections (jiyeon) are considered very important, and those who did not 
graduate from a good South Korean university are strictly speaking, excluded. 
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WORK AS SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CAPITAL 
 
Coming from a country where jobs are allocated by the state, many defectors have a difficulty 
competing for jobs in the highly competitive South Korean society. When seeking 
employment, a social network and references are essential to vouch for one's credibility. 
North Koreans face an extremely difficult challenge, as they usually have no contacts upon 
arrival in South Korea. There is also a licensing system for many professional jobs in South 
Korea, and North Koreans lack certification to prove their skills. There is a difference in the 
skills and knowledge required for jobs in an industrialized society (Chung 2008). Even for 
South Koreans it is hard to get and keep a job. In South Korea it is common for people to be 
among the “precariat”, a social class where people are in a situation characterized by an 
existence of uncertainty, insecurity and stress (Standing 2011). Those in the precariat lack job 
security, as they are part-time or short-term workers or have contracts that gives them little 
security for the future. This leads to an existence that affects both the material and 
psychological well-being of a person. After finishing Hanawon, defectors are presented with 
multiple choices in almost everything they do and want to become. It is confusing coming 
from a place were jobs where allocated by the state, to a place where in theory the 
possibilities are endless.  
Unemployment is a worldwide issue. But North Korea boasts of 100% employment. 
Because the state allocates positions, there are no jobless people. Officially, unemployment 
becomes zero, but it does not mean that everyone has to do work every day. The communist 
country allots jobs to all its citizens regardless of their wills. Irrespective of their aspirations, 
most people have to stick to the career the state has chosen for them. The North Korean social 
system is a tightly organized one where individual initiatives tends to be discredited. 
Generally speaking, an individual’s life is severely constrained with respect to choice of jobs, 
education, and many aspects of daily life. 
Many defectors do not know which kinds of jobs are available and where to seek them 
out. Where do they want to work? Do they want to become entrepreneurs orchefs, to work 
with computers or with animals? The MoU tries to present the opportunities defectors have, 
and also sets up annual job fairs to help defectors who are struggling to find work. Securing 
employment is crucial for them in their efforts to find stability and settle successfully in a new 
country. Choosing a career that can guarantee a good income and stability and at the same 
time reflect their abilities and their interests effectively is a major issue. But with education 
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and work experience from North Korea things may not work out in South Korea. Instead, 
many people change their career path. Skills learnt in the North, are not always transferable to 
the labor market in the South.  
Having used up their resettlement money, defectors have a hard time getting and 
keeping employment. There can be many reasons for this such as discrimination at the 
workplace or during the interview, or that defectors are shunning the 3D jobs.  
 
According to a survey by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights in 2011, the 
unemployment rate for North Korean defectors was 13.8 percent, 4.5 times higher than the 
rate for the general citizens of South Korea, and their average income barely exceeded the 
legal minimum cost of living. The monthly average living expenses of 78.7 percent of the 
North Korean defector households did not meet the legal minimum cost of living, and 45.5 
percent of them were welfare recipients (Seo et al., 2012). (Sohn, 2013, 110-111). 
 
A recent government poll from the Korean Hana Foundation showed that defectors on 
average work more than South Koreans, but earn less. Defectors monthly income is about 
1,47 million KRW compared to 2,23 million KRW earned by South Koreans (Korea Herald 
2015). Sulli said that she experienced discrimination during job interviews. In South Korea it 
is expected that every educational or work experience should be on the resume. When they 
realized that Sulli had attended school in North Korea she said they were shocked or would 
say they would call her on a later occasion. One time she was offered the job but was asked if 
she was fine being paid half of what another person would receive. Talking about it makes her 
angry, and her whole body language changed just by telling me this incident. “Why would I 
accept it? Am I not human because I am “talbukja”? Since she doesn’t have a choice in 
letting her boss know her identity as a North Korean, she told me that she would never let her 
co-workers know she is from North Korea. 
After reading Joanna Hosaniak’s report I noticed that one of her North Korean 
interviewees expressed a similar feeling after she felt she was being treated unfairly at her job 
saying that “I quit that job and in the new one they don’t know I’m from North Korea” (2011: 
24). Sonia Ryang in her article “North Koreans in South Korea: In Search for their humanity” 
(2012) also presents a story where a young woman working part-time as a waitress in an 
restaurant was often approached by customers: 
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who assume that she is available for prostitution due to her “culturally inferior marker as a 
North Korean defector” and the associated assumption that she would do almost anything in 
order to get a little more money (Yi 2010: 283) (Ryang, 2012, 6). 
 
To protect their identities, defectors may withhold information. But hiding their stigma can 
lead to further isolation, depression and anxiety. Trying to pass as a “normal” and hide their 
stigma, individuals have to be vigilant, and always check their behavior for even tiny traces of 
their stigma (Goffman 1963). Because of Victoria’s episode at the PC-bang, she does not 
disclose her identity as a North Korean defector unless it is with close friends. Identity is 
developed by the individual, but it has to be recognized and confirmed by others. So although 
they try to claim membership in the South Korean society, their effort may be in vain if the 
society does not acknowledge their claim and instead continue to treat them as other, despite 
their best effort to pass (Choo, 2006, 591-592). Hiding their true identity could cause a 
problem of insecurity as they start to believe this perceived identity, and when they are not 
ascribed this identity by others they may start questioning their existence. People now have to 
link the past, present and future together, and create an overall identity accordingly. Social 
identity is not static or constant, but dynamic and changing, and should be seen as a social 
process (Jenkins 2000). Social identity is never something you can take for granted, and that 
simply is, identity is something created and recreated, and something that must always 
reinvent itself in new ways (Jenkins 2000). Identity is something we ascribe to ourselves or 
each other without having necessarily particularly good reasons for it. If I were asked about 
my nationality, I would say for example I was Norwegian. But "Norwegian" is not something 
I can be, it is something I call myself, something I said (or someone else says) that I "am". 
This thinking has proved particularly useful when seeking to understand the living conditions 
in modern, globalized society, characterized by migration and cultural encounters, flickering 
media images, unstable family relationships and increasingly rapid pace of change 
everywhere in society. In such a world identity is never something you simply are or “have”, 
and can take for granted. It is something created and recreated, always re-invented in new 
ways, as circumstances and selves change through time.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this dissertation has been to explore the challenges North Korean defectors 
experience being integrated into South Korean society and the status of North Korean 
refugees in South Korea. My informants gave me an insight into North Korea's history and 
implicitly, and sometimes directly, explaining why they chose to defect. They also told me 
about experiences living in South Korea. There are stories about meeting South Korean 
people, the struggle to adapt, difficulties with the language, getting a stable job and 
developing a network. It involves them as North Koreans, as defectors, as minority group and 
as new citizens.  
 
Chapter one provided an overview, and introduced the research question and the informants. 
Chapter two, the methodological chapter, described the fieldwork location and the history of 
South Korea. While chapter three provided an insight into the North Korean context and the 
songbun system, it also gave an overview of the routes out of North Korea and a description 
of what defectors experience arriving in South Korea. The main points of the thesis emerged 
in chapter four about South Korean “Koreanness”, and how it is intertwined with nationalism, 
identity and stigma. Chapter five dwells on how modernity and consumption becomes a tool 
defectors actively use to portray themselves as South Koreans.  
 
One of the biggest challenges for North Korean defectors are the expectations of the South 
Korean society. What I have experienced throughout my fieldwork and the writing of this 
thesis is that both North Korean defectors and the South Korean society and its people have 
expectations of each other, and sometimes conflicting expectations. North Koreans have 
expectations before they leave North Korea about their new lives on the outside. As many had 
watched South Korean dramas before they left, defectors had an idea of South Korean society, 
and a supposition of how possibly their new life would unfold itself. The South Korean 
society, on the other hand, have high assumptions and expectations of North Koreans 
regarding adaptation and integration. The biggest challenge for South Korean society is to 
change the mindset of the South Korean people in how they portray North Koreans and 
foreigners in general. The idea of South Korea being a homogenous population needs to be 
slowly chipped away. Arriving in a country that is so fast-paced puts pressure on defectors to 
adapt fast. This new society is characterized by risk and choice. In this new society there are 
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so many choices of who you want to be which creates an anxiety of not making the right 
choices and not being as great or achieving ones full potential. The sheer volume of 
consumption in this modern world makes it easier to buy a self-identity instead of creating 
one. The individuals have to be constantly updating and upgrading their self-identities in a 
fast paced modern society, where it seems that everything is just temporary.  
While on paper the defectors are South Korean citizens, they have to create this South 
Korean identity in everyday life. This social expectation that defectors will adapt and 
integrate faster does not take into consideration their hardships before coming to and the 
confusion they experience when arriving in South Korea.  Defectors are a heterogeneous 
group where people adapt to society in different ways and at different pace where age, gender, 
mental condition, traumas, status in North Korea, skills and abilities all work differently for 
different people. Although the South Korean society provides many benefits for defectors, 
adapting to a capitalist and highly competitive society can be difficult for any refugee, not just 
those from North Korea. The break with the traditional “first society” of North Korea meant 
for defectors a newfound freedom. The social systems that previously provided the defectors 
with a security system is now gone. As members of the “second society”, defectors try to find 
their individuality and self-identity in the South Korean society. Defectors now have to rely 
on themselves and make their own future. This newfound freedom has for my informants 
worked in different ways. Park for instance, after several years has accepted his identity as a 
person of the Korean peninsula, not distinguishing between North or South Korea. Dana, is 
open about her identity as a North Korean, if she is asked about it. Victoria, Krystal, Nana, 
Harry and Sulli on the other hand try their best to hide their identities as North Koreans. They 
now have to make reflexive biographies, where almost every choice is up for question, and 
there are no right answers.  
 South Koreans seem to be apathetic about defectors and towards national unification. 
Despite the steady number of incoming defectors coming each year, there seems to be little 
interest in learning about them among the South Korean population. In South Korea it is 
almost expected that a person is to perform exceptionally well in life, in all categories such as 
appearance, education, profession and socially. In the South Korean society, there is an 
overarching strive to become wealthier, better-looking and more successful: 
 
In the eyes of many South Koreans, however, the New Settlers have little to offer. Especially 
now, as more North Korean women and children reach South Korea, many South Koreans 
view them as an increased burden on taxpayers. Moreover, North Korea is no longer of very 
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great interest to South Koreans. Specifically, South Koreans today are no longer interested in 
the possibility of national reunification; reunification figures prominently neither in their daily 
lives nor in their visions of the future. [...] The passion of South Koreans across the political 
spectrum no longer concerns reunification. Rather, monetary gain, material success, financial 
security, and improvement of status and looks, are much more urgent concerns for most 
Koreans. Accordingly, the value of North Korean defectors has fallen, even as the cost of their 
maintenance has risen (Ryang, 2012, 7). 
 
The South Korean society cannot just expect North Koreans to integrate into society but also 
to be included into the society by South Koreans. As South Korea has little experience with 
multiculturalism and is a monistic society, it is expected of refugees to change their ways of 
life instead of accepting the differences and living in a multicultural society.   
 NGOs, private organizations and volunteers also try to assist defectors in this 
adaptation and settlement process. As some of my informants show, some have successfully 
succeeded in changing their mindset from collectivistic to individual-centered, but some of 
them still find this shift difficult. The shift is from emphasizing on sacrifice and hard work for 
the socialist society to focusing on self-realization and personal achievements in the 
capitalistic society. Although defectors try to ascribe themselves the identity of South Korean 
there is a too narrow concept of who can be considered Korean in South Korea. As defectors 
try hard to become “cultured citizens”, but not being ascribed this identity can be very hard. 
My informants did take active steps in erasing their “North Koreanness”, but they still would 
never be able to fully become South Koreans even how hard they try. Stigmatization and 
discrimination because one was born in the “wrong” Korea, occurs as my informants told me 
both at school, work and even at PC-bangs.  
 The narrowness of who is considered “real” Korean in South Korea, turns identity into 
problems. “Who am I”, was a question Park asked himself with good reason, once he had 
escaped the classificatory strait-jacket of the North Korean songbun system. Categorization 
based on a notion of ethnic and/or racial homogeneity creates a narrow and rigid category of 
belonging: “certain groups of people, or even entire communities are marginalized and 
subordinated because they do not meet the criteria for “membership” (Lim, 2009, 2). It will 
take a long time to change a people's mindset. After decades of propaganda about North 
Korea, the Southern idea and perception of North Korea was shaped. The minister of the 
MoU, Mr. Hong Yong-pyo, has highlighted that the South Korean government and society 
will “work hard to help them, but North Korean refugees' willingness and efforts are most 
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important” (Ministry of Unification 2015). Timothy Lim however feels differently and in his 
article states that;  
 
 These were well-intended measures, but such measures, for the most part, failed to 
 address the underlying source of discrimination, marginalization, and subordination, 
 namely, a national identity that defines difference and diversity as undesirable and, 
 therefore, inferior (Lim, 2009, 6). 
 
The South Korean state and government together with NGOs, civil society, religious, and 
volunteer organizations has to cooperate to achieve this goal of changing the mindset of the 
people. The main hindrance towards reunification is the growing difference between the two 
people living North and South of the 38
th
 parallel. Looking at the current situation that the 
North Korean defectors face in South Korea the future of integrating even more North 
Koreans looks uncertain. As North and South Korea has developed at different pace and 
directions over the past sixty years, the expectations of North Koreans are not met and many 
North Koreans struggle with acculturation.  
 Human rights activists believe North Korean defectors have considerable influence on 
North Korean citizens and the most power to weaken the regime. In other words, North 
Korean defectors are who the North Korean regime fears most. In that regard, it is appropriate 
to establish and strengthen a North Korean community in South Korea, as one unified group 
is stronger than several individual voices. To date it is more or less taboo to be of North 
Korean origin. Therefore, we see a tendency that defectors largely attempts to integrate into 
the South Korean society while distancing themselves from their North Korean identity. If 
North Korean defectors positions are strengthened and valued, they can play an active role in 
the changes not just in South Korea but also within North Korea.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
NGO - Non-governmental organization 
 
KWP - Korean Workers Party (North Korea) 
 
NIS - National Intelligence Service (South Korea) 
 
Bowibu - State Security Department 
 
Inminban - Neighborhood watch  
 
Songbun - social class system 
 
Songun - military first policy 
 
Kim Il-sung - founder of North Korea 
 
Kim Jong-Il - Son of Kim Il-sung 
 
Kim Jong-eun - Grandson of Kim Il-sung  
 
DMZ – Demilitarized Zone (military zone between North and South Korea) 
 
MoU - Ministry of Unification in South Korea 
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